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  Limited liability is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, limited 
liability may help overcome investors’ risk aversion and facilitate cap-
ital formation and economic growth. On the other hand, limited liabil-
ity is widely believed to contribute to excessive risk-taking and exter-
nalization of losses to the public. The externalization problem can be 
mitigated imperfectly through existing mechanisms such as regulation, 
mandatory insurance, and minimum capital requirements. These 
mechanisms would be more effective if information asymmetries be-
tween industry and policymakers were reduced. Private businesses typ-
ically have better information about industry-specific risks than policy-
makers. 
  A charge for limited liability entities—resembling a corporate in-
come tax but calibrated to risk levels—could have two salutary effects. 
First, a well-calibrated limited liability tax could help compensate the 
public fisc for risks and reduce externalization. Second, a limited lia-
bility tax could force private industry actors to reveal information to 
policymakers and regulators, thereby dynamically improving the pub-
lic response to externalization risk. 
  Charging firms for limited liability at initially similar rates will lead 
relatively low-risk firms to forgo limited liability, while relatively high-
risk firms will pay for limited liability. Policymakers will then be able 
to focus on the industries whose firms have self-identified as high risk, 
and thus develop more finely tailored regulatory responses. Because 
the benefits of making the proper election are fully internalized by in-
dividual firms, whereas the costs of future regulation or limited liability 
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tax changes will be borne collectively by industries, firms will be un-
likely to strategically mislead policymakers in electing limited or un-
limited liability. By helping to reveal private information and focus reg-
ulators’ attention, a limited liability tax could accelerate the pace at 
which policymakers learn, and therefore, the pace at which regulations 
improve. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE LIFE CYCLE OF RISK AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
The last two centuries have brought remarkable progress in global 
wealth and health. Since the early 1800s, real GDP per capita has in-
creased more than fivefold,1 while global life expectancy has more than 
doubled.2 Improvements in life expectancy and quality of life, while fa-
cilitated by rising levels of productivity and prosperity, appear to be 
due in large part to the growth of scientific knowledge and its applica-
tion to personal and public health.3 
Business investment is an important driver of economic growth 
and innovation. However, economic activity can entail substantial risks 
to life and property, not only for investors, but for the broader public. 
These risks are often unknown or, at best, incompletely understood. 
Well-documented estimates suggest that currently known negative ex-
ternalities could be in the range of 5 to 20 percent of GDP per year.4 
Investors are skittish about accepting potentially unlimited liabil-
ity for risks they only partially understand. Investors and business pro-
moters have therefore lobbied for and been granted easy access to lim-
ited liability.5 Limited liability prevents investors from losing more 
than the capital that they invest in a business. As profits accumulate 
(or the business winds down), investors can liberate capital from the 
hazardous confines of an operating company and provide it with a safer 
perch.6 
 
 1. Jutta Bolt & Jan Luiten van Zanden, The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research on 
Historical National Accounts, 67 ECON. HIST. REV. 627, 637 (2014).  
 2. See JAMES C. RILEY, RISING LIFE EXPECTANCY: A GLOBAL HISTORY 1 (2001); James 
C. Riley, Estimates of Regional and Global Life Expectancy, 1800-2001, 31 POPULATION & DEV. 
REV. 537, 542 (2005).  
 3. David Cutler, Angus Deaton & Adriana Lleras-Muney, The Determinants of Mortality, 
20 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 116–17 (2006). 
 4. See infra notes 113–28 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corpo-
rate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 399–400 (1996). 
 6. See infra Part II.D. 
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Limited liability for torts and similar involuntary claims is a dou-
ble-edged sword. On the one hand, limited liability may help overcome 
investors’ risk aversion and facilitate investment and economic growth. 
On the other hand, limited liability is generally believed to contribute 
to excessive risk-taking and externalization of losses to the public.7 
Limited liability cannot eliminate risk. It can only transfer the adverse 
consequences of risk away from the actor who is effectively deciding 
how much risk to take and, in so doing, encourage greater risk-taking. 
Limited liability in contract is uncontroversial because it is a default 
rule that can be altered by agreement.8 
Over time, a given risk that was once unknown will become in-
creasingly familiar, identifiable, measurable, predictable, and ulti-
mately possible to regulate or insure against.9 Unknown risks often 
have a life cycle. In the early stages, risks begin to reveal themselves to 
those most intimately familiar with an activity. Near misses proliferate 
and relatively small private losses accumulate, but the magnitude of 
any loss externalization is too small to capture the attention of the pub-
lic or policymakers.10 Private businesses and their sophisticated inves-
tors typically have better information about industry-specific risks than 
policymakers. Private market actors who are most attuned to these 
risks may move to insulate themselves and externalize the risk onto 
others who are less knowledgeable.11 Over time, as economic activity 
 
 7. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991). 
 8. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability, 106 HARV. L. REV. 446, 451 (1992); Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1417, 1421, 1425 (2010). Liability to contractual counterparties can be further 
limited through asset partitioning and contractual non-recourse provisions. Limited liability can 
be waived through guarantees. In a Coasian world without transaction or bargaining costs, chang-
ing the default rule with respect to limited liability in contract would have no effect. R. H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1960). 
 9. Cf. generally Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insur-
ance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783 (2005) (emphasizing, in the context of terrorism insurance, the role of risk 
measurement to insuring risks).  
 10. See generally Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 495–522 (2015) (describing financial services, manufacturing, and 
transportation bailouts). 
 11. Cf., e.g., Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U. 
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 7 (1996) (“[F]lood relief or subsidized flood insurance may encour-
age inefficient building on flood plains.”); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for 
a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1368 (2011) (noting that pursuing the 
insurance and stabilization goals of government bailouts “may magnify moral hazards and dan-
gers of overuse or abuse by government and corporate beneficiaries, who may seek to engage in 
greater risk-taking at the public’s expense”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 
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increases and the cumulative probability of negative outcomes rises, 
externalized losses grow. 
Today we take it for granted that industrial pollution is a health 
hazard. Many air pollutants cause severe and costly respiratory and 
cardiovascular problems for individuals who neither earn their liveli-
hoods producing industrial goods nor make use of the responsible 
products.12 Pollution is the classic example of an externality.13 Alt-
hough industrialization began in Britain in the late eighteenth century, 
links between air pollution and health only began to be researched in 
the United States in the 1950s, after particularly severe incidents of 
pollution in the 1940s and 1950s commanded attention.14 Air pollution 
was not regulated at the federal level until the 1970s.15 Recent research 
continues to identify new links between health problems and man-
made sources of pollution.16 
It is likely that individuals directly involved in industry, with 
greater exposure and greater expertise, would have been cognizant of 
health risks earlier than the public or policymakers. For example, many 
tobacco company scientists believed that smoking was harmful to 
health as early as the 1950s.17 Yet as late as 1999, the tobacco industry 
publicly maintained that there was no scientific proof that tobacco 
causes health problems.18 
 
210–11, 225 n.202 (2008) (noting that federal insurance funded by taxpayers encourages bank risk-
taking).  
 12. RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD 
PEOPLE DO BAD THINGS 185–89 (1996). 
 13. William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 
307, 307 (1972). 
 14. Alvin Powell, Air Pollution’s Invisible Toll, HARV. UNIV. CTR. FOR ENV’T (June 9,  
2014), http://environment.harvard.edu/news/huce-headlines/air-pollutions-invisible-toll [https:// 
perma.cc/EE9S-KK5V]; History of Air Pollution, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https:// 
www.epa.gov/air-research/history-air-pollution [https://perma.cc/6GUH-6QZ9]. 
 15. Powell, supra note 14; U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 14.  
 16. See Michael S. Friedman, Kenneth E. Powell, Lori Hutwagner, LeRoy M. Graham & W. 
Gerald Teague, Impact of Changes in Transportation and Commuting Behaviors During the 1996 
Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta on Air Quality and Childhood Asthma, 285 JAMA 897, 897 
(2001); Chris A. McLinden et al., Space-Based Detection of Missing Sulfur Dioxide Sources of 
Global Air Pollution, 9 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 496, 496 (2016). 
 17. K. M. Cummings, C. P. Morley & A. Hyland, Failed Promises of the Cigarette Industry 
and Its Effect on Consumer Misperceptions About the Health Risks of Smoking, 11 TOBACCO 
CONTROL i110, i111 (2002). 
 18. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL 
OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL 
WARMING 10–35 (2011); Cummings et al., supra note 17, at i110; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, 
The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE 
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If losses grow large enough, they will capture the attention of the 
public and of policymakers, and may lead to post hoc bailouts or relief 
efforts.19 Even without an identifiable bailout, externalized costs may 
burden social programs that insure against poor health, disability, or 
poverty, or programs that provide for public safety.20 The social costs 
of relief efforts eventually create pressure to regulate the activity in 
order to reduce risks, or to introduce a formalized system of mandatory 
insurance in which industry participants (or vulnerable groups) pay, at 
least in part, for the relief that they are likely to eventually receive.21 
Formal insurance schemes become more tenable as risks become more 
clearly identified, measurable, and actuarially predictable.22 
This life cycle model roughly describes the evolution of bailouts, 
regulation, and compulsory insurance schemes in many different indus-
tries and at various points in U.S. history.23 What should be noted is 
that during the early stages of the cycle, when risks are poorly under-
stood by most, limited liability provides investors with insurance-like 
benefits without the expense of insurance premiums or the restraint 
and cost of safety regulations.24 
The long history of iterative discovery of risk suggests several in-
sights. First, there are risks that are largely unknown and unknowable 
to most parties. Second, the best information about these risks, albeit 
potentially very limited, is likely in the hands of industry participants. 
 
L.J. 1163, 1171–72 (1998). 
 19. See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK 
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 132–35 (2010); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of 
Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 438–39 (2011); Levmore, supra note 11, at 15, 17; Manns, supra note 
11, at 1361; Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2526 (2003). 
 20. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 5, 9–12, 31 (discussing unemployment and health insur-
ance). 
 21. See id. at 12; Manns, supra note 11, at 1381. 
 22. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 23. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 3–4, 7, 17–27 (1998), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/53V9-4YE6]; Eugene A. Rosa & William R. Freudenburg, The Historical De-
velopment of Public Reactions to Nuclear Power, in PUBLIC REACTIONS TO NUCLEAR WASTE 32, 
32–34 (Riley E. Dunlap, Michael E. Kraft & Eugene A. Rosa eds., 1993) (describing the gradual 
growth of public awareness of the risks of nuclear power and the resulting development of safety 
regulations and public insurance); Levmore, supra note 11, at 1–2, 12 (describing the development 
of federal flood insurance).  
 24. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1929. When crises reveal the magnitude of 
risk, the public’s reaction could lead to overregulation. See Brett McDonnell, Dampening Finan-
cial Regulatory Cycles, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2013); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the 
Dark 1 (Yale Prog. for Stud. in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 442, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1974148 [https://perma.cc/C6CV-KXN2].  
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Third, limited liability, dividends, interest payments, and other judg-
ment-proofing strategies enable investors and industry participants to 
benefit from gains while externalizing losses onto third parties (partic-
ularly where limited liability does not correct existing risk aversion or 
agency costs). Fourth, holding the costs of these strategies constant, ex-
ternalization strategies will most often be used where the benefits are 
greatest—that is, where there is the greatest opportunity to externalize 
losses that would otherwise have been borne by investors. 
The fact that these risks are not known and are not precisely quan-
tifiable does not mean that nothing should be done to address them. 
One can safely assume that the costs of externalized risks—and the 
commensurate benefits to investors and employees—are greater than 
zero. Thus, even a modest countervailing policy would be an improve-
ment over the status quo.25 
A contemporaneous charge for limited liability and entities that 
shield assets from involuntary claimants—loosely modeled on the cor-
porate income tax but more closely calibrated to risk levels—might of-
fer a promising solution. Despite the inevitable challenges of accu-
rately measuring risk levels ex ante and of enforcing unlimited liability 
ex post, a limited liability charge would be a powerful policy tool. 
Indeed, simply introducing such a charge will dynamically im-
prove regulators’ and policymakers’ ability to price and police un-
known risks. This is because industry participants’ choices to pay the 
proposed fee or forgo protection will reveal information to regulators 
and policymakers about knowledgeable parties’ internal assessments 
of risk. 
When limited liability comes at a cost, those who believe that they 
are engaged in riskier activities will be more likely to opt into limited 
liability, while those who believe their actions are comparatively be-
nign will be more likely to forgo it.26 If limited liability were priced uni-
formly relative to scale, then variation in the proportion of similar firms 
that opt into limited liability would reveal information about private 
 
 25. See GLENN SHAFER, A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE 250–51 (1976) (discuss-
ing Bayesian priors); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1883. 
 26. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have noted the advantages of penalty defaults as a mech-
anism to force informed parties to share information with counterparties by attempting to con-
tract around the default rule. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 98–100 (1989).  
Alex Raskolnikov has similarly proposed to use tax elections to force taxpayers to self-sort 
and reveal information about their propensity for tax evasion. Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing 
Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691 (2009). 
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assessments of the relative riskiness of various activities. Although 
risks are assumed to be nearly uniform within a group, information 
about risk and perceptions of risks still vary among members of the 
group.27 Thus, elections regarding limited liability would aggregate and 
reveal information about risk, much as market pricing or prediction 
markets aggregate and reveal information.28 Regulators could use this 
information to more closely study and eventually regulate or insure 
against high-risk activities. 
Regulators could also iteratively reprice limited liability in subse-
quent periods, charging different prices to different risk-pooled groups 
of firms based on information revealed in the previous period.29 Thus, 
a risk-uniform group in which relatively few or no firms opted into lim-
ited liability in the previous period—thereby indicating relatively low 
risk for the group—would signal policymakers to reduce the price of 
limited liability in the next period. On the other hand, a risk-uniform 
group in which a very large proportion of firms opted into limited lia-
bility—thereby indicating relatively high risk—would signal policy-
makers to increase the price of limited liability in subsequent periods. 
Because the benefits of making the proper election are fully internal-
ized by individual firms, whereas the costs of future regulation or lim-
ited liability tax changes will be borne collectively by the risk-uniform 
group (i.e., competitors within an industry), firms will be unlikely to 
strategically mislead policymakers when electing limited or unlimited 
liability.30 
When prices are set such that similar firms are roughly equally 
likely to choose limited liability or forgo it, one can infer that the cost 
 
 27. In other words, risks are uniformly distributed within each group, but perceptions of risk 
are not uniformly distributed. A simplifying assumption is that such information is normally dis-
tributed. 
 28. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549, 585 (1984); Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets 
Where Trades Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 574 (1976); Justin Wolfers & Eric 
Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 107, 112 (2004). 
 29. Cf. Mitchell A. Kane, Taxation and Multi-Period Global Cap and Trade, 19 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 87, 95 (2011) (discussing a multiperiod, multijurisdictional cap-and-trade system). 
 30. If electing for limiting liability subjects a firm to specifically and individually targeted 
regulatory scrutiny, a risky firm might choose unlimited liability to avoid unwanted regulatory 
attention. This is especially true because in practice, even with de jure unlimited liability, the firm 
does not fully internalize the risk. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. However, if scrutiny 
is spread across a group of similarly risky competing firms, collective action problems will encour-
age firms to make elections driven by individual risk assessments, not what is strategically advan-
tageous for the industry as a whole. See infra Part IV. A.  
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of limited liability is priced roughly at its value.31 Once limited liability 
is correctly priced within each category of firms, differences in the price 
of limited liability among different categories of firms would be a good 
indicator of differences in residual risk that are known or suspected by 
industry participants, but unknown to regulators or the public. 
Regulators may be able to group firms into risk pools only imper-
fectly; firms within a group will inevitably be less than perfectly uni-
form. However, this can also be an information-forcing mechanism that 
could lead to dynamic improvements over time. Low-risk firms that are 
mistakenly grouped with high-risk firms have incentives to reveal in-
dustry-specific information that can help regulators and policymakers 
better distinguish between high-risk and low-risk firms. 
Costly, rather than costless, limited liability could thereby pres-
sure industry to share information with the public through limited lia-
bility election. By helping to reveal private information and focus reg-
ulators’ attention, a limited liability tax could accelerate the pace at 
which policymakers learn, and therefore, the pace at which regulations 
improve. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of limited liability, dis-
cussing the reasons for limited liability and conceptualizing it as a form 
of insurance. Part II describes problems with limited liability, such as 
how it can facilitate externalization. It includes estimates of how large 
the externalization problem might be. Part III describes previous solu-
tions to the externalization problem and their limitations. Part IV pre-
sents a novel approach to charging for limited liability and iteratively 
pricing it to force firms to reveal information about internal assess-
ments of risks to the public. After the conclusion, Part IV is followed 
by an Appendix, which discusses some administrative details. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
Liability is limited in practice without the law making it so. Indi-
viduals and firms are often capable of producing harm that exceeds 
their capacity to compensate victims because both their assets and their 
future earning capacity are limited. This is known as the “judgment-
proof problem.”32  Liability can be further limited by operation of law.  
 
 31. If one assumes some risk aversion, then the optimal price may be one at which more than 
half of firms choose limited liability, though not all. If all firms choose limited liability, that would 
be a clear sign that limited liability is underpriced.  
 32. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 
360–61 (1984) [hereinafter Shavell, Liability for Harm]; Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal 
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“Limited liability” commonly refers to legal protections that prevent 
claimants who are harmed by a firm from collecting against the firm’s 
investors when the assets of the firm are not sufficient to cover claims 
against the firm.  Firms can therefore remove assets from the reach of 
claimants by distributing assets to investors. 
Scholarship addressing the judgment-proof problem and related 
issues has focused on losses imposed on nonadjusting or involuntary 
creditors, like the government or tort victims. In contrast, sophisticated 
financial investors such as bank lenders are believed to protect them-
selves from risk through negotiated lending terms such as interest rates, 
security, and covenants.33 Although sophisticated creditors can obtain 
priority and maximize recovery for themselves in the event of losses or 
demand high interest rates to compensate themselves for risk, unso-
phisticated creditors who typically lack such protections cannot free 
ride on sophisticated creditors’ efforts. 
Judgment proofing can lead to overinvestment in risky activities, 
underinvestment in safety precautions, and underinsurance.34 In other 
words, the judgment-proof problem is not simply a question of distri-
bution—it also raises efficiency concerns. 
The law limits liability even further. State property-exemption 
laws and the federal bankruptcy code shield many individual assets—
and in the case of bankruptcy, much of future income—from the reach 
of most creditors.35 State business-entity laws provide limited liability 
 
Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 271, 271 (1984).  
 33. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 882 (1996); Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders 
and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1821 (1992); Yair 
Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Em-
pirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1051 (2008). 
 34. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1882–83 (1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death 
of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 20–22 (1996).  
This assumes the background legal liability regime either appropriately deters or under-
deters excessive risk-taking when judgments are fully collectible. In other words, [expected liabil-
ity] ≤ [expected harm]. Shavell argues that setting liability equal to harm in individual cases could 
under-deter because there is some probability that in cases in which harm is done, tortfeasors will 
not be identified, suit will not be brought, or plaintiffs will not prevail. Shavell, Liability for Harm, 
supra note 32, at 363–70. Many kinds of harm are not actionable, for example, because of statutory 
immunity. See, e.g., The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. 109-92, 119 Stat. 
2095 (2005) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–03 (2012)) (banning lawsuits against gun manufactur-
ers and distributors when their products are used to commit crimes). Those who believe that tort 
liability is excessive may view limited liability and asset protection as backdoor corrective reforms. 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1918. 
 35. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 
1393 (1985) (explaining the bankruptcy discharge and property exemptions as providing a “fresh 
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for investors in corporations and other entities. Legislators created 
these limits on liability to help overcome individual risk aversion, facil-
itate transferability of equity ownership and reduce search costs, and 
facilitate socially beneficial investments.36 
Stephen Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson trace the historical 
origins of limited liability to sovereign immunity.37 Early corporations 
were granted exclusive authority to perform functions that had tradi-
tionally been performed by the state, and therefore they enjoyed state-
like protection from creditors.38 According to Bainbridge, Henderson, 
and Stephen B. Presser, broad-based limited liability became widely 
available to small businesses in the United States because of the decen-
tralization of corporate law, competition between states for charters 
and investment, and political pressure from business leaders and their 
lawyers.39 
Bainbridge and Henderson applaud this development. They view 
limited liability as helpful, and perhaps even essential, to capital for-
mation and economic growth.40 Limited liability helps overcome inves-
tors’ risk aversion in a world in which businesses’ vast needs for capital 
and professional expertise necessitate the separation of ownership and 
control. Limited liability also eliminates the complexity and illiquidity 
that could result if an individual investor’s personal liability turned on 
the personal wealth of other investors or the particular time when fre-
quently traded investments were owned.41 And while shareholders and 
many voluntary creditors could contract for limited liability, a default 
rule establishing limited liability (unless specifically waived) saves 
them the time and expense. 
 
start” and preventing debt overhang). 
 36. For an overview of justifications for limited liability, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. 
TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY ch. 3 (2016). See also Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock 
& Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 117, 118–26 (1980) (discussing similar legislative motivations behind limited liabil-
ity laws in England and Canada). 
 37. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 36, at 20–32. 
 38. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? What Bank 
Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453, 463–69 
(2016). 
 39. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 36, at 32–38, 52–53, 77 & n.112, 230; see also 
generally STEPHEN PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 19–24 (2018) (discussing the his-
tory of limited liability in U.S. states).  
 40. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 36 at 19, 302.  
 41. Id. at 11–12, 54–66, 82–83. 
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The prospect of imposing unlimited liability on contractual coun-
terparties and creditors in the general course would be a radical depar-
ture from established practice.42 Although lender liability might im-
prove efficiency in some contexts,43 most advocates of unlimited 
shareholder liability have shied away from lender and contractual 
counterparty liability except in extraordinary circumstances because 
such liability could exacerbate conflict within the capital structure and 
create information problems.44 Unlimited liability for investors makes 
the value of the investment to each investor dependent on the wealth 
of other investors who can satisfy judgments if liability is joint and sev-
eral.45 It also raises complicated problems about the timing of owner-
ship of a stake in a firm and when liability should attach,46 which could 
dramatically restrict liquidity.47 
Even when liability is not limited by law, it may be limited in fact 
by the high costs of collecting small sums from many investors. Such 
practical considerations influence doctrine. For example, suppose that 
payouts to a firm’s shareholders or bondholders following a leveraged 
buyout leave that firm undercapitalized. Although fraudulent transfer 
law and nationally uniform procedures in bankruptcy theoretically 
could be used to recover the payouts, courts have broadly construed a 
variety of legal defenses that make such remedies particularly unlikely 
against small investors.48 In the modern era, with more sophisticated 
techniques of judgment proofing and financial engineering widely 
available, retroactive recoveries might be substantially lower and costs 
 
 42. Lenders and contractual counterparties may face liability—beyond the loss of their in-
vestment—in very limited contexts related to the cleanup of hazardous waste under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and related leg-
islation. Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms 
and Environmental Risk, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1171, 1181–82 (1995).  
 43. Id. 
 44. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1930; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, 
Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1641–43 (1991); Alan O. Sykes, The Eco-
nomics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1253 (1984).  
 45. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1906; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra 
note 36, at 129–31. 
 46. For a proposed solution, see infra note 111. 
 47. Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability through a Procedural Lens, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 391 & n.15 (1992). 
 48. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the 
Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 
133–34 (2011); Michael L. Cook, Another Court of Appeals Broadly Reads Settlement Payment 
Safe Harbor, HARV. BLOGS: BANKRUPTCY ROUNDTABLE (May 13, 2014), http://blogs.law.har-
vard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2014/05/13/another-court-of-appeals-broadly-reads-settlement-
payment-safe-harbor [https://perma.cc/BH2N-84AH]. 
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of collection substantially higher. 
Empirical evidence suggests that large, capital-intensive busi-
nesses can function without limited liability for shareholders, at least 
in certain legal environments.49 In the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, double-liability regimes for shareholders of commercial 
banks permitted partial recoveries, though often with substantial cost 
and delay.50 American Express operated without limited liability until 
the 1960s.51 Many scholars argue that limited liability was less im-
portant to capital formation and economic growth than the emergence 
of business entities that facilitated asset partitioning.52 
Nevertheless, the view that limited liability attracts investors is rel-
atively uncontroversial. Henderson and Bainbridge, though clearly 
 
 49. See E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massa-
chusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1356 (1948); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double 
Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 55 (1992); 
Mark I. Weinstein, Don’t Buy Shares Without It: Limited Liability Comes to American Express, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 194 (2008) [hereinafter Weinstein, American Express]; Mark I. Weinstein, 
Share Price Changes and the Arrival of Limited Liability in California, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3 
(2003) [hereinafter Weinstein, California]. 
Critics have suggested that changes in substantive and procedural law, such as the rise of 
mass torts and class action lawsuits, have increased potential liability dramatically. Previous peri-
ods when large businesses operated without the benefit of limited liability might therefore not 
predict what would happen in the current legal regime if limited liability were removed. See 
BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 36, at 40–42, 66; Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Cred-
itors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 515 (1976). Others argue that the unprec-
edented abundance of financial capital makes current investors more risk tolerant. See Hockett 
& Omarova, supra note 38, at 485–87. 
 50. See Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 436, 458–
59 (2012); Howell E. Jackson, Losses from National Bank Failures during the Great Depression: 
A Response to Professors Macey and Miller, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 919, 922 (1993) (noting 
substantial delays and challenges of collecting from shareholders, especially during the Great De-
pression); Macey & Miller, supra note 49, at 55 (finding nominal 50 percent recovery rates over 
time). 
 51. Weinstein, American Express, supra note 49. 
 52. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (“[L]imited liability . . . is . . . of distinctly secondary importance. The 
truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is . . . the reverse of limited liability—namely, the shield-
ing of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s owners or managers.”); 
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2006) (“While limited liability has evident and important functional comple-
mentarities to entity shielding, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the creation of business 
firms as separate and distinct economic actors. Firms can prosper without limited liability, but 
significant enterprises lacking entity shielding are largely unknown in modern times.”). 
SIMKOVIC IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2018  1:35 PM 
288  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:275 
strong proponents of limited liability, acknowledge that limited liabil-
ity creates problems of its own—private profits can be amplified, with 
no social benefit, through externalization of losses onto the public.53 
Henry Hansmann views limited liability for torts as a largely un-
necessary and unfortunate development in corporate law.54 Hansmann 
acknowledges that joint and several unlimited liability might create 
search costs and information problems for investors, who would be 
concerned with the wealth of other investors in a venture and their ca-
pacity to pay judgments.55 However, Hansmann’s analysis suggests that 
proportionate unlimited liability for torts—that is, liability proportion-
ate to an investor’s stake in the business—would not create such prob-
lems and would avoid many of the problems associated with limited 
liability.56 Proportionate unlimited liability for torts is therefore an al-
ternative to limited liability. As discussed below in Part II.E., Hans-
mann’s analysis and subsequent critiques imply that proportionate un-
limited liability for torts should be extended not only to shareholders, 
but also to other financial investors in the firm.57 
A. Limited liability as mispriced insurance 
Given the choice between proportionate unlimited liability and 
limited liability, most investors would prefer limited liability. Legal 
scholars have generally concluded that the benefits of providing limited 
liability usually outweigh the costs.58 But this does not necessarily mean 
that governments should provide limited liability for free, any more 
than governments should provide costly physical infrastructure with-
out charging user fees.  
Limited liability resembles insurance. Limited liability entities ob-
tain insurance-like benefits, in that the owners of limited liability enti-
ties can offload risks of certain losses. In insolvencies of limited liability 
entities, some losses are borne by governments.59 Indeed, actual insol-
vency is unnecessary for limited liability to facilitate loss externaliza-
 
 53. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 36, at 47–51, 225. 
 54. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1895. 
 55. Id. at 1890–91. 
 56. Id. at 1893–94. 
 57. Id. at 1898. 
 58. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 611–
16 (1986). 
 59. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Re-
sponsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017).  
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tion. The mere specter of liability pushing a firm to the brink of insol-
vency might persuade regulators, courts, and plaintiffs to agree to 
lower damages or forgo litigation altogether rather than expend re-
sources seeking damages that would be uncollectible.60 
Insurance providers routinely charge a premium for bearing the 
risk of loss, depending on the extent of the risk. Private insurance com-
panies will only insure risks that are specific, limited, and quantifiable 
so that actuarial analysis can calculate profitable insurance pricing. 
Limited liability effectively provides uncapped insurance for any risk 
that might materialize, no matter how unpredictable or poorly under-
stood. No private insurance company would offer insurance on these 
terms, at any price. The catastrophic insurance provided by limited li-
ability, essentially gratis, is clearly underpriced when virtually all busi-
nesses that are aware of the availability of limited liability opt into it. 
Limited liability, properly priced and accompanied by appropriate 
safety regulation, could create value, just as insurance helps create 
value by overcoming risk aversion, aggregating information about risk, 
and spreading sensible precautions. 
II.  HOW LIMITED LIABILITY CAN EXACERBATE 
EXTERNALIZATION 
Limited liability exacerbates numerous problems related to judg-
ment proofing. This is because limited liability prevents investors from 
losing more than their investment in a particular firm, which tends to 
be a relatively low fraction of each investor’s net worth, and shields 
investors’ personal income. Limited liability also facilities diversifica-
tion, which dramatically increases the likelihood that a business strat-
egy of externalizing harm will benefit investors, even those with rela-
tively short time horizons and limited assets. Limited liability 
combined with diversification causes investors to behave as if they are 
 
 60. Relatively few potential plaintiffs sue, and damages awarded and actually collected tend 
to be modest. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New 
Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 315 (1999). Deep-pocketed institutions are targeted 
more often than individuals with questionable ability to pay. Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-
Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 606–07 (2006). Litigation routinely settles for less 
than the maximum amount of defendants’ insurance coverage. Cf. David A. Hyman, Bernard 
Black & Kathryn Zeiler, Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas 
Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 56, 58 (2007) (noting that 
settlements in Texas medical malpractice cases are driven by expected payouts, which rarely ex-
ceed the limits of insurance coverage). 
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risk neutral, because uncorrelated volatility within individual invest-
ments does not lead to high volatility in the total value of a diversified 
portfolio of investments. 
Thanks to limited liability and diversification, a strategy of exter-
nalization can boost private returns without increasing personal finan-
cial risks. Therefore, businesses that are managed with the primary 
goal of maximizing shareholder value should pursue externalization 
strategies whenever such strategies are available. Presumably, they of-
ten do pursue such strategies. 
A. Asymmetric payoffs and limited assets at risk 
Parties that are judgment proof face asymmetric payoffs—unlim-
ited upside potential and downside risk that is capped at the level of 
their assets and future earning capacity. Downside exceeding this cap 
will be externalized onto third parties and will not affect the judgment-
proof party. Consider a nuclear power plant operator that could inad-
vertently render large portions of a city uninhabitable. If a disaster oc-
curs, the operator will be unable to provide adequate compensation 
from its own assets, no matter the liability regime. 
From the perspective of a profit-maximizing, judgment-proof nu-
clear power plant operator with $100 million in assets,61 there is no dif-
ference between a nuclear disaster that produces $120 million in dam-
ages ($20 million more than it can ever compensate) and one that 
produces $120 billion in damages ($119.9 billion more than it can ever 
compensate). 
Thus, skimping on maintenance in a way that will increase profit-
ability in good times but increase the magnitude of an already cata-
strophic disaster—if one materializes—could maximize private bene-
fits for the nuclear power plant operators’ investors, while causing 
social harm.62 The dangers of nuclear power may be relatively well un-
derstood and highly regulated today, but they were not always. Con-
sider how poorly equipped regulators are to constrain high-magnitude, 
 
 61. This example implicitly assumes that going-concern value is not substantially higher than 
asset value. If that is not the case, the example would still be correct as long as the amount of the 
judgment exceeds the greater of asset value or going-concern value. 
 62. See, e.g., Pat Akey & Ian Appel, The Limits of Limited Liability: Evidence from Industrial 
Pollution 1, 3 (13th Annual Mid-Atlantic Research Conference in Finance (MARC) Paper, 2018), 
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3083013 [https://perma.cc/9K9J-ZUXG] (providing evidence that 
stronger limited liability protection for parent companies reduces investment in subsidiaries’ pol-
lution abatement technologies and increases costs borne by other stakeholders).  
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low-probability risks that are not widely known or understood outside 
of industry until after disaster strikes. 
1. Increasing variability of outcomes.  Business activities have 
uncertain outcomes that can be understood as probability 
distributions, with the most likely outcomes having greater density (i.e., 
appearing taller on a frequency plot) and the least likely outcomes—
typically those that are extremely positive or negative63—having lower 
densities. 
Holding all else constant,64 the wider the probability distribution 
(the more extreme the outcomes) and the fatter the tails of the distri-
bution (the more likely extreme outcomes), the more likely it is that 
negative outcomes will exceed the capacity to compensate victims. Be-
cause normally distributed outcomes are symmetrical, increasing the 
variance of the probability distribution—that is, taking on bigger 
risks—will increase the upside benefits for the judgment-proof party 
far more than the downside risks that it will face.65 For example, skimp-
ing on maintenance and inspections may reduce operating costs and 
increase profits if all goes well, but it may also increase the likelihood 
and harmfulness of a disaster. 
Consider a simple mathematical example.66 A particular invest-
 
 63. Extreme outcomes are relatively unlikely when the distribution of outcomes is normal 
(i.e., bell shaped). Many, but not all, natural phenomena follow a normal distribution. Extreme 
outcomes are as likely as median or mean outcomes when the distribution is uniform (i.e., rectan-
gular). In a few situations, the distribution may be such that extreme outcomes are more likely 
than moderate outcomes. The extent to which extreme outcomes are likely, relative to their like-
lihood under a normal distribution, is measured by kurtosis. 
 64. That is, holding constant assets, future earning potential, and expected returns. Expected 
return is the weighted average of the outcomes—that is, the sum of the probability of each out-
come multiplied by its magnitude. 
 65. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor 
Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55, 61–62 (1999).  
 66. In mathematical notation, 
a  = investor assets and future income available for collection; ܽ ≥ 0 
fu = likelihood of upside scenario; 0 < ௨݂ < 1 
fd = likelihood of downside scenario; ௗ݂ = 1 − ௨݂ 
mu = magnitude of upside scenario; ݉௨ > 0 
md = magnitude of downside scenario; ݉ௗ < 0 
Vs = expected value to society 
Vp = expected value to investor 
 
௦ܸ =  ( ௨݂. ݉௨) +  ( ௗ݂. ݉ௗ)  
௣ܸ =  ( ௨݂. ݉௨) +  ( ௗ݂. −݉݅݊(ܽ, −݉ௗ))  
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ment has an expected value of zero when all costs and benefits are in-
ternalized. The investment will only be undertaken once. There is a 90 
percent chance that the investment produces $100 million in profits. 
There is a 10 percent chance that the investment produces $900 million 
in losses. The expected value of the more likely, profitable scenario is 
$90 million while the expected value of the less likely, unprofitable sce-
nario is negative $90 million. The overall expected value of the invest-
ment is zero. It does not make sense for a risk-neutral investor to make 
this investment because there is nothing to be gained in expectation. 
For a risk-averse investor who fears losses more than he values gains, 
this investment is even less attractive. 
Now introduce judgment proofing. Assume the investor has $900 
million in assets, so that he would have fully internalized the potential 
losses in the investment scenario described above. However, the inves-
tor takes on greater risks (i.e., increases the variance of potential out-
comes) without increasing his assets. The investment now has a 90 per-
cent chance of producing $500 million in profits and a 10 percent 
chance of losing $4.5 billion. Because both the upside and downside 
have quintupled, with all gains and losses fully internalized, the invest-
ment still has an expected value of zero. 
However, because the judgment-proof investor can lose at most 
$900 million—all of his assets—if the unprofitable scenario material-
izes, from the investor’s perspective the expected value of the unprof-
itable scenario remains negative $90 million (10 percent chance of los-
ing $900 million). In contrast, the expected value of the profitable 
scenario has increased to $450 million, making the total expected value 
of the investment $360 million to the investor and zero to society. A 




௣ܸ =  ௦ܸ if ܽ ≥ −݉ௗ 
௣ܸ > ௦ܸ if ܽ < −݉ௗ 
 
The difference between the expected value to investor and the expected value to society 
(assuming ܽ < −݉ௗ), is 
 
ܸ݌ − ܸݏ = ௗ݂. (− min(ܽ, −݉ௗ) − ݉ௗ)  
ܸ݌ − ܸݏ = ௗ݂. −(a + ݉ௗ)  
 
Thus, the higher the likelihood of a downside scenario exceeding the assets of the investor, 
and the greater the extent to which the cost of the downside scenario exceeds the assets of the 
investor, the larger the expected transfer from third parties to the investor. 
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By changing the numbers slightly, we can also make an investment 
with negative value to society profitable for the investor. Thus, inves-
tors would (on average and in expectation) be able to enrich them-
selves by destroying value and making everyone else worse off. Com-
panies seeking to maximize value for shareholders might actively seek 
to create probability distributions such that all potential losses are con-
centrated in scenarios in which the firm will already be insolvent, be-
cause this maximizes the chances of externalizing losses onto other par-
ties.67 
2. Reducing assets at risk.  Holding all else constant,68 the lower the 
level of assets and future earning potential of a party, the greater the 
likelihood that losses will be externalized onto third parties and that 
judgment proofing will produce perverse incentives. This is one of the 
reasons that limited liability makes a strategy of externalization more 
effective. Limited liability can reduce the assets at risk (i.e., available 
to compensate victims) to the minimum amount that must remain 
invested in the business for the business to function. 
Consider the example in section II.A. above. Suppose that the 
business only requires $100 million of capital to function. With limited 
liability, investors can cap their losses in a downside scenario at $100 
million (the minimum assets required to run the business) rather than 
$900 million (all of their assets). With limited liability, the expected 
value of the investment to investors increases from $360 million to $440 
million (90% chance of $500 million in the upside scenario, plus 10% 
chance of a loss of $100 million in the downside scenario). 
This $80 million increase in value to the investor is not value cre-
ation—it is a pure change in the distribution of value. In expectation, 
this value is extracted from everyone in society and transferred to the 
investors. 
B. Risk aversion and diversification 
A highly risk-averse private investor might not undertake this in-
vestment, notwithstanding the high private expected value, because 
 
 67. Lynn M. LoPucki, supra note 34, at 41–42; see Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kami-
netzky, supra note 48, at 214–18. Richard Squire calls this “correlation seeking.” Richard Squire, 
Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2010).  
 68. That is, holding constant the variance, mean, and other characteristics of the probability 
distribution. 
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even the relatively low chance of losing all of his assets (or a large pro-
portion of his assets) might deter the investor more than the prospect 
of gains attracts him. In other words, risk aversion helps mitigate the 
judgment proof problem.69 
However, excessive risk aversion could also deter socially benefi-
cial investments. Risk aversion can be mitigated through legal devices 
that shield assets from judgments and enable investors to undertake 
risky investments without the possibility of losing all of their assets and 
future income. These legal devices include: asset protection trusts, 
which shield assets placed within the trust from claims against the set-
tlor or beneficiary of the trust;70 state law exemptions of certain prop-
erty of individuals from collections by unsecured creditors;71 the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which shields future income of individuals from 
collections by discharging most forms of indebtedness;72 and limited li-
ability, which shields investors’ assets—other than the investment it-
self—from claims against the firm.73 
Limited liability may be particularly prone to exacerbate the judg-
ment-proof problem. This is because limited liability is extremely ef-
fective at shielding investors from the consequences of failure, espe-
cially when coupled with diversification, and can therefore more 
completely overcome risk aversion.74 
 
 69. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 27–28 (1999).  
 70. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1035, 1039 (1999). 
 71. Richard M. Hynes, Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of Property 
Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. 19, 19–22 (2004).  
 72. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 524, 727, 1141, 1228, 1328 (2012). 
 73. John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Mariana Pargendler, What is 
Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 9 (3d ed. 2017). 
 74. There is a voluminous literature in portfolio theory dedicated to calculating the optimal 
amount of diversification (or the ideal size of each individual investment as a share of total assets) 
when expected returns from each investment are positive but there is some chance of negative 
returns that could reduce the value of individual investments to zero but not below (i.e., liability 
for each investment is limited). See, e.g., Nils H. Hakansson & William T. Ziemba, Capital Growth 
Theory, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESOURCE & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 65, 65–86 
(1995); LEONARD C. MACLEAN, EDWARD O. THORP & W. T. ZIEMBA, THE KELLY CAPITAL 
GROWTH INVESTMENT CRITERION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 42–44, 472 (2011); Nils H. 
Hakansson, Capital Growth and the Mean-Variance Approach to Portfolio Selection, 6 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 517, 526 (1971); Michael Stutzer, Portfolio Choice with Endogenous 
Utility: A Large Deviations Approach, 116 J. ECONOMETRICS 365, 384 (2003). This literature gen-
erally suggests that risk aversion can be managed and risk of ruin minimized by increasing diver-
sification (reducing each individual investment as a share of assets) rather than avoiding high-risk 
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Personal bankruptcy and legal defenses against creditors at state 
law entail unpleasant, time-consuming, and potentially stigmatizing 
consequences for debtors, and will also typically substantially deplete 
their assets. Although the expected value ex ante might be $360 million 
(or in the example in Part II.A.2, $440 million), the value ex post could 
either be a gain of $500 million or a loss that comes close to permanent 
financial ruin. 
In contrast, consider an investor who diversifies by investing a rel-
atively small portion of his assets in many different firms, each of which 
provides limited liability and takes risks that are uncorrelated with one 
another. Each investment is now like a separate roll of the dice, and 
thanks to limited liability, the unlimited gains and limited losses from 
each can be aggregated. By the law of large numbers, as the number of 
independent trials increases—that is, the number of uncorrelated in-
vestments in different firms increases—the ex post outcomes will in-
creasingly approximate the ex ante expected value.75 In other words, a 
well-diversified investor will most likely encounter ex post outcomes 
that are roughly $440 million. In practice, most investments will be at 
least partially correlated, so although diversification cannot completely 
eliminate variance, it can reduce it.76  
Returning to the example of the nuclear power plant, even a risk-
averse investor with small stakes in thousands of different nuclear 
power plants, each organized as a separate limited liability entity, and 
each with a chance of disaster uncorrelated with the others, should pre-
fer that all of the nuclear plants skimp on maintenance to maximize 
profits in ordinary times. This, in turn, would increase the chances that 
losses from each plant will be externalized onto third parties. 
 
investments with high expected value.  
 75. P. L. Hsu & Herbert Robbins, Complete Convergence and the Law of Large Numbers, 
33 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 25, 25–26 (1947); Harald Uhlig, A Law of Large Numbers for 
Large Economies, 8 ECON. THEORY 41, 41 (1996). 
 76. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79 (1952) (“[This] presumption[,] 
that the law of large numbers applies to a portfolio of securities[,] cannot be accepted. The returns 
from securities are too intercorrelated. Diversification cannot eliminate all variance.”).  
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Diversification of investments is now virtually universal.77 Costs 
and minimum asset requirements for diversification have largely dis-
appeared with the growth of indexed mutual funds,78 and a “duty to 
diversify” is now firmly established even in conservative trust law.79 
C. Shareholder-centric corporate governance 
Managers who are focused on maximizing returns to shareholders 
and are cognizant of limited liability and diversification should engage 
in risk-taking that is excessive from the perspective of social welfare.80 
In contrast, agency costs—managers pursuing their own interests 
ahead of shareholders’—may mitigate excessive risk-taking, because 
risk-averse managers cannot diversify their jobs as easily as sharehold-
ers can diversify their investments. Governance innovations such as in-
centive compensation that align managerial interests with shareholders 
and encourage greater risk-taking,81 along with the general shift toward 
a shareholder-centric model of corporate governance,82 could exacer-
bate the judgment-proof problem. 
Bainbridge and Henderson argue that externalization problems 
could be mitigated by piercing the corporate veil for shareholders who 
specifically direct acts that lead to liability.83 But corporate tendencies 
toward externalization do not require shareholders or senior managers 
to directly control decision making. Externalization only requires that 
 
 77. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Ac-
tivist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865 (2013) 
(explaining the triumph of the portfolio theory of investment). 
 78. Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, What Drives Market Share in the Mutual Fund Industry?, 
16 REV. FIN. 81, 97 (2012). Total market index funds that offer exposure to thousands of firms—
essentially the entire U.S. stock market—are now available for annual fees as low as 0.03% of 
assets, and with as little as $1 to invest. See Schwab Total Stock Market Index Fund, CHARLES  
SCHWAB, https://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/investing/investment_help/investment_re-
search/mutual_fund_research/mutual_funds.html?path=%2FProspect%2FResearch%2Fmutu-
alfunds%2Ffees.asp%3Fsymbol%3DSWTSX [https://perma.cc/YS9P-CBY2].  
 79. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best In-
terest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 970 (2005). 
 80. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empower-
ment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658–59 (2010); Steven L. Schwarcz, Excessive Corporate Risk-Tak-
ing and the Decline of Personal Blame, 65 EMORY L.J. 533, 541–43 (2015); Squire, supra note 67, 
at 1201 n.175. 
 81. Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 
650, 653–54 (1984); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323 (1976). 
 82. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 440−41, 455 (2001). 
 83. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 36, at 302–04. 
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managers are provided strong incentives to behave in shareholders’ 
best interests, for example by having their compensation and job secu-
rity tied to share price. Large shareholders may disproportionately in-
vest in companies that take greater risks, generate larger short-term 
returns,84 and pay steady dividends,85 while withholding investment 
from companies that are managed more conservatively. Shareholders 
can influence executive compensation to align managerial interests 
more closely with their own.86 While managers correctly infer share-
holders’ wishes for greater risk-taking, shareholders can avoid liability 
for decisions that are formally made by managers. Similarly, senior 
managers can delegate decision making to more junior, possibly judg-
ment-proof subordinates, reward performance that can only be 
 
 84. See Aydoğan Altı, Ron Kaniel & Uzi Yoeli, Why Do Institutional Investors Chase Return 
Trends?, 21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 694, 720 (2012) (concluding that institutional investors tend 
to “chase return trends” by buying assets with high recent returns); Geoffrey C. Friesen & Travis 
R. A. Sapp, Mutual Fund Flows and Investor Returns: An Empirical Examination of Fund Investor 
Timing Ability, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 2796, 2797 (2007) (discussing studies that show that funds 
with better short-term performance experience greater net cash flow); Jason Karceski, Returns-
Chasing Behavior, Mutual Funds, and Beta’s Death, 37 J. FIN & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 559, 
583 (2002) (noting that mutual funds investors invest “largely on the basis of relative past perfor-
mance”). 
 85. See Easterbrook, supra note 81, at 651 (describing investors’ preference for dividend-
paying stocks).  
 86. See id. at 653–54; Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, Executive Compensa-
tion and Risk Taking, 19 REV. FIN. 2139, 2139 (2015) (“It is well known that structuring chief 
executive officer (CEO) incentives to maximize shareholder value in a levered firm tends to en-
courage excess risk taking.”); Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Executive Compen-
sation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577, 577–79 
(2006); Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market, 24 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2822, 2822 (2011) (“A large empirical literature has shown that risk is a first-order deter-
minant of compensation contracts.”); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 81; Richard A. Posner, Are 
American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, What if Anything Should be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1013, 1020–25 (2009); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Com-
pensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2011); cf. Shawn Cole, Martin Kanz 
& Leora Klapper, Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Com-
mercial Bank Loan Officers, 70 J. FIN. 537, 542 (2015) (summarizing how lenders use “perfor-
mance pay to align the risk and time preferences of the bank’s employees with [their own]”).  
Indeed, Robert Jackson argues that executive compensation and alignment of managerial 
and investor incentives is an important driver of private equity firms’ success. Robert J. Jackson 
Jr., Private Equity and Executive Compensation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 638, 646 (2012). Lucian Beb-
chuk and others have argued that senior executives at publicly traded companies can sometimes 
shape their own compensation to reduce alignment with shareholders, but executives might do so 
in ways that amplify their incentives to take risks. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger 
Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 
27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 274–76 (2010); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: 
Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 848–49 
(2002). 
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achieved through risk externalization, and disclaim any knowledge or 
responsibility if problems subsequently materialize.87 
The rise of diversification, shareholder empowerment, and corpo-
rate governance reforms may all help overcome risk aversion and en-
courage value-creating investments, but in combination with limited li-
ability, they could also exacerbate the judgment-proof and 
externalization problems. 
D. Multiple periods, dividends, interest, and salaries 
In the real world, most businesses are not short-term affairs that 
are swiftly wound up with all gains or losses distributed to investors. 
Instead, businesses can persist for decades, in some cases outliving 
their initial investors. The accumulation of profits within a business 
would mitigate the advantages of externalization if such profits could 
be seized by claimants in the event of a subsequent disaster. 
Limited liability facilitates risk externalization in part because it is 
possible to transfer profits and valuable assets from an entity that might 
face future liability to investors or employees who will be shielded from 
such liability. If corporations retained all profits from their activities, 
during good years when positive outcomes materialized, corporations 
would build reserves which would then be available in bad years to sat-
isfy any liability on judgments that might arise.88 
Investors can better externalize risks while investing in long-lived 
business entities if there are mechanisms that enable business entities 
to partition good years from bad. This is similar to reducing assets and 
increasing the variance of outcomes.89 
 
 87. Justin Fox & Stuart V. Jordan, Delegation and Accountability, 73 J. POL. 831, 831 (2011) 
(“A common critique of legislative delegation of policy authority to the bureaucracy is that it 
undermines politicians' accountability to voters.”); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk 
Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1341, 1355, 1374, 1385 (1999); cf. John 
C. Coffee Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem 
of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 418, 433, 457 (1981)’. 
 88. See Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 889, 906–07 (2006); Donald Kehl, The Origin and Early Development of American Dividend 
Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 36, 41 (1939) (“[I]f limited liability was to survive, a rule against impair-
ment of corporate capital by dividends or other repayments to stockholders was inevitable.”); 
Schwarcz, supra note 69, at 34 (identifying dividends or other transfers of value to investors as a 
critical step in judgment proofing). 
 89. These strategies make externalization more likely. See supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
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These mechanisms include dividend payments to shareholders, 
share repurchases,90 interest payments to creditors, and (nondeferred) 
compensation to employees in excess of that which would be possible 
without limited liability. Routine payments, made while a company is 
apparently solvent (though engaged in risky activities), will rarely be 
questioned by courts.91 Legal challenges to such payments, such as 
fraudulent transfer or preference claims, succeed infrequently—usu-
ally when the payments are made on the eve of insolvency or under 
unusual circumstances suggesting coercion, value destruction, or 
fraud.92 
Dividends, interest, and compensation—in combination with lim-
ited liability—create a one-way valve in which the benefits of risk-tak-
ing can flow to investors and key employees while the long-term costs 
can be externalized onto third parties. 
E. Beyond shareholders: creditors and counterparties 
Many analyses of limited liability have focused on the limited lia-
bility of shareholders (equity holders).93 Equity holders do not have 
limited liability when the business is operated as a general partnership 
or sole proprietorship, but they do have limited liability protection if 
the business is organized as a corporation, limited liability company 
(LLC), limited partnership (LP), or limited liability partnership (LLP). 
Equity investors are also generally thought to be the risk-preferring 
residual claimants and owners of the company,94 and therefore the 
most obvious beneficiaries of loss externalization through limited lia-
bility.  Therefore, classic analyses of limited liability and externaliza-
 
 90. Stock repurchases resemble dividends in that they distribute corporate cash to share-
holders. However, repurchases have different transaction costs, tax consequences, effects on ex-
ecutive stock options, and distributive consequences. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider 
Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 421 (2000). See generally Amedeo 
De Cesari, Susanne Espenlaub, Arif Khurshed & Michael Simkovic, The Effects of Ownership 
and Stock Liquidity on the Timing of Repurchase Transactions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1023 (2012) (dis-
cussing timing and strategic concerns in corporate decisions to repurchase stock).  
 91. Hamill, supra note 5, at 415–16. 
 92. See Cook, supra note 48.  
 93. See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 50, at 409–10; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, 
at 1880–81.  
 94. See Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 NW. 
U. L. REV. 140, 164 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 91–92, 100 (1985). 
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tion, such as those of Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraak-
man95 and David Leebron,96 as well as more recent efforts by Peter 
Conti-Brown,97 have focused on incentives to ameliorate excessive 
risk-taking by scaling back limited liability for shareholders. 
However, there are other stakeholders whose liability is limited as 
a matter of course: creditors, managers, employees, and other contrac-
tual counterparties.98 Compared to shareholders, these parties can of-
ten exert as much if not more control over corporate policy.99 In addi-
tion, the financial return on debt instruments like high-yield bonds and 
leveraged loans (as well as more complex convertible debt instru-
ments) can closely resemble the return on equity.100 This has led many 
scholars to conclude that the debt-equity distinction is at best ambigu-
ous and at worst untenable.101 
Professor Grundfest argues that even if limited liability for share-
holders were unavailable, investors could easily obtain equity-like re-
turns and limited liability.102 They could do so through changes to cap-
ital structure (i.e., replacing equity with debt), financial engineering, 
and by paying judgment-proof investors to hold the small portions of 
the capital structure that carry risk of unlimited liability. Similarly, Pro-
fessor LoPucki has argued that businesses can easily avoid tort liability 
by partitioning their operations into operating entities that take risks 
and separate entities that own assets.103 The entities can organize their 
 
 95. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1879–81.  
 96. Leebron, supra note 44, at 1604–05. 
 97. Conti-Brown, supra note 50, at 416. 
 98. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
147, 148 (1998); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Abil-
ity of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 203, 203 (1997); Sykes, 
supra note 44, at 1241. 
 99. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Cor-
porate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (2006) (highlighting the role of creditors in 
corporate governance); G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 926–27 (2000); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corpo-
rate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 751 (1997). 
 100. As noted above, managers with certain compensation structures may also have equity-
like incentives that encourage greater risk-taking and de facto limited liability.  
 101. Adam O. Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate 
Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, 118–19 (1985); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of 
Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 414–15 (1992); Edward D. 
Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 730 (2011); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity 
Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1072–94 (2000); David A. Weisbach, 
Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1648 (1999). 
 102. Grundfest, supra note 101, at 408.  
 103. LoPucki, supra note 98, at 149–50; Schwarcz, supra note 69, at 9.  
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joint operations through contract rather than through shared owner-
ship and corporate governance. 
In addition, two empirical studies of transitions from unlimited to 
limited shareholder liability did not find much evidence of benefits re-
dounding to shareholders.104 This raises questions about the classic 
view that shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of limited liability. 
Just as the burden of the corporate income tax probably does not fully 
fall on shareholders,105 the benefit of limited liability may not exclu-
sively accrue to them. 
As previously noted, shareholders are indifferent to the magni-
tude of losses exceeding the point at which the value of their invest-
ment falls to zero. Creditors are similarly indifferent to the magnitude 
of losses exceeding the point where the value of their own investment 
falls to zero, and to losses which can be externalized to other creditors 
or lower-priority stakeholders.  Because creditors have higher priority, 
losses are absorbed first by shareholders (up to the value of sharehold-
ers’ investment in the firm), and then by creditors (up to the value of 
creditors’ investment in the firm). 
Consider a company that is financed with $50 million of equity and 
$50 million of debt. Shareholders will care about risks that reduce the 
value of the company from $100 million to $50 million. If this coincides 
with a default, equity’s claim on the company may be extinguished and 
all value will then belong to the creditors. Creditors will care about 
risks that could reduce the value of the company from $50 million to 
zero. But creditors will be indifferent to risks that could reduce the 
value of the company from zero to a negative value because all such 
losses will be externalized and fall on someone other than creditors. 
Creditors are generally believed to seek to limit risk-taking be-
cause, unlike shareholders, creditors’ upside is capped—the most cred-
itors can gain is their principal and contractual interest payments.106 
However, creditors will routinely trade looser covenants and fewer lim-
its on corporate risk-taking in return for higher interest payments.  
 
 104. The first study is from California in the early twentieth century. Weinstein, California, 
supra note 49, at 3. The second is of a single company in the 1960s, American Express, that was 
primarily financed with short-term debt. Weinstein, American Express, supra note 49, at 190. The 
results may not be fully generalizable to modern companies that could face more substantial tort 
liability. Interestingly, the empirical case for secured creditors benefiting by externalizing risks to 
tort claimants is also contested. Listokin, supra note 33, at 1078. 
 105. See Li Liu & Rosanne Altshuler, Measuring the Burden of the Corporate Income Tax 
Under Imperfect Competition, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 215, 233 (2013). 
 106. Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 48, at 214–18. 
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Like shareholders, creditors enjoy limited liability. With high enough 
interest payments, creditors can obtain equity-like risks and returns. 
Thus, investors who are creditors need not limit risk in ways that 
inadvertently protect nonadjusting creditors.  It is easy for corporate 
managers acting in the interests of shareholders to coopt financial cred-
itors by sharing with them the benefits of externalizing risks to third 
parties.  If debt is already risky—that is, if debt has a high yield relative 
to the risk-free rate—this suggests that it is reasonably likely that cred-
itors will not be paid in full unless profitability improves.  In such situ-
ations, greater risk-taking (i.e., making unlikely but very negative out-
comes more negative and relatively likely positive outcomes more 
positive) can provide upside to creditors. 
High-yield debt and leveraged loans are often sufficiently risky 
that they resemble equity. The limited liability of investors who struc-
ture their investment as debt rather than equity can pose similar prob-
lems with respect to exacerbating the judgment-proof problem. More-
over, secured creditors’ priority typically ensures that even if very 
negative outcomes materialize and the firm’s liabilities exceed its assets 
by a wide margin, secured creditors will recover the lion’s share of 
whatever assets are available.107 Indeed, impairing the rights of secured 
creditors arguably violates constitutional protections.108 
Even unsecured or subordinated creditors will not fully price 
many risks that could be externalized to third parties. Creditors will be 
largely insensitive to risks that rarely materialize, but when they do ma-
terialize can be expected to exceed creditors’ full investment and to 
therefore be externalized to third parties.109 In other words, like equity 
holders who benefit from limited liability entities, creditors can walk 
away from very large losses thanks to prevailing rules that limit liability 
 
 107. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 33, at 859; James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Se-
cured Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship between the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 973 (1983); cf. Mark J. Roe & Frederick 
Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1235, 1276 (2013) (“In general, the most sophisticated, best organized, and best financed 
creditor groups are best positioned to pursue and obtain priority jumps than other types of cred-
its.”). 
 108. See Rogers, supra note 107, at 977 (questioning the argument that the uncompensated 
impairment of secured lenders’ rights in bankruptcy proceedings violates the Fifth Amendment). 
 109. To be more precise, suppose Scenario A and Scenario B are equally likely. Scenario A 
would completely wipe out unsecured creditors, while Scenario B would completely wipe out un-
secured creditors and cause massive harm to third parties as well. The difference in riskiness be-
tween Scenario A and Scenario B would not be reflected in market prices. 
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of creditors and contractual counterparties to the size of their invest-
ment. 
Thus, limited liability benefits financial creditors and managers, 
not just shareholders. An approach that targets shareholders, rather 
than firms’ beneficiaries more broadly construed, is ill-equipped to ad-
dress the challenges of limited liability. Extending Hansmann’s analy-
sis, this implies that pro rata unlimited liability should apply to financial 
investors in firms generally—shareholders, creditors, and warrant-
holders.  While this would admittedly be a significant departure from 
customary practice and entail implementation challenges, it could mit-
igate loopholes in unlimited liability regimes noted by Professor 
Grundfest.110 
How could proportionate unlimited liability be extended from 
shareholders to other investors?  Liability would need to be roughly 
proportionate to the benefits investors receive from providing capital 
to finance a firm.  And how could a system of unlimited liability for 
creditors as well as shareholders be compatible with a priority regime 
in which losses are borne by shareholders first and creditors last? 
Liability could be weighted according to both the aggregate value 
and timing of investors’ holdings.  That is, liability exceeding the unen-
cumbered assets of the firm and its insurance coverage would be pro-
portionate to investors’ holdings in the firm during the time periods 
when the firm undertook actions that likely caused harm, and not 
simply during the later period when the harm materialized. 
Each investor’s proportionate interest in the firm could be meas-
ured as the weighted average price of the investor’s holdings in the firm 
divided by the total market value of the firm, including stock, debt, 
warrants, and options.111  This would typically not be measured as of a 
 
 110. I say mitigate rather than eliminate because investors would likely devise creative ap-
proaches to benefit from a firm’s activities without incurring potential liability as a financial in-
vestor. For example, lessors and licensors resemble secured creditors. But if substitutes for inves-
tors are not treated as investors for purposes of proportionate unlimited liability, firms could offer 
some backers limited liability by leasing their assets and licensing their intellectual property rather 
than borrowing money from them to buy or develop the same assets. Policing the boundaries of 
a firm and defining “financial investors” would be challenging. Nevertheless, including broader 
groups of investors, and not just shareholders, would make a proportionate unlimited liability 
regime harder to evade. 
 111. When precise market valuations of debt, equity, and warrants are not available, proxies 
like enterprise value may be used. Enterprise value is the market value of a firm’s equity plus the 
book value of its debt, less cash. TIM KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART, & DAVID WESSELS, 
VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 103 (5th ed. 2010). 
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single point in time, but rather averaged over several time periods, be-
cause it may not be possible to pinpoint precisely when the harm was 
caused—for example, for toxic or long-manifesting torts.112 
Thus, for example, if an investor owned 10 percent of the total 
value of the firm during 20 percent of the time period during which firm 
activities caused harm, the investor would be liable for 2 percent of the 
firm’s liability exceeding the firm’s unencumbered assets and insurance 
coverage. 
F. How big of a problem? 
How large are the unknown risks and costs that companies may 
externalize? This question is inherently difficult to answer precisely be-
cause the risks are unknown. However, attempts to estimate the mag-
nitude of externalization of known risks suggest that the problem is 
substantial enough to merit additional policy interventions. 
In the mid-1990s, Ralph Estes, a CPA, sought to measure the ag-
gregate “social costs” of business enterprise, which Estes defined as 
costs imposed on society that are neither internalized nor accounted 
for by firms.113 Factoring in workplace injuries and accidents, medical 
expenses from unsafe products, and health costs from pollution, Estes 
found that external costs to U.S. taxpayers totaled approximately 
$2.618 trillion in 1994 dollars.114 His analysis does not distinguish be-
tween corporate and noncorporate firms, but instead encompasses all 
business enterprise in the United States.115 Adjusted only for infla-
tion,116 this estimate in 2017 would be approximately $4.3 trillion—
more than 20 percent of U.S. GDP.117 
In reaching this number, Estes combined original research with 
“specific corporate social costs [that] have been estimated in a variety 
 
 112. Christopher F. Edley Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 384–86 (1993) (discussing challenges relating to the timing of exposure 
and illness in the toxic-torts context).  
 113. ESTES, supra note 12, at 171. 
 114. Id. at 177–78. 
 115. Id. at 172. 
 116. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/E3DQ-GY4A] (last visited 
July 3, 2018). $2.618 trillion in December of 1994 is equal to $4.311 trillion in December of 2017. 
Id. 
 117. U.S. GDP in 2017 was approximately $19.391 trillion. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: FOURTH QUARTER AND ANNUAL 
2017 (THIRD ESTIMATE) 8 tbl.3 (2018), https://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/
gdp4q17_3rd.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU56-XJSX]. Note that 4.311 divided by 19.391 is 22 percent.  
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of contexts.”118 Estes does not purport to find a precise figure, but ra-
ther claims to reach a conservative estimate.119 Estes’s estimate of the 
public cost of private corporations includes four categories: (1) costs to 
workers; (2) costs to customers; (3) costs to communities; and (4) costs 
to the nation.120 
Within these categories, the largest costs are deaths from work-
place cancer ($274.7 billion), price-fixing conspiracies, monopolies, 
and deceptive advertising ($1.2 trillion), and health issues caused by air 
pollution ($225.9 billion).121 Estes argues that this estimate is conserva-
tive because “only costs that are directly identifiable have been esti-
mated,” whereas “other social costs, as well as secondary and multi-
plier effects, have generally been omitted.”122 Estes does not include 
the cost of serious poisonings from pesticides or the cost of psycholog-
ical human suffering.123 
There are numerous methodological challenges with this ap-
proach—the estimates used come from distinct studies conducted by 
numerous organizations and researchers at different times using vary-
ing methodologies.124 Estes’s inclusion of monopoly pricing is perhaps 
stretching the definition of “externalization.” However, twenty years 
later, Estes’s study remains one of the most comprehensive and widely 
cited studies of aggregate externalization costs. 
A more recent and less ambitious estimate from 1999 tabulates 
specific costs that add up to nearly $900 billion in 2017 dollars.125 In 
1999 dollars, these included $53.9 billion in annual health costs from 
cigarettes, $135.8 billion for the consequences of unsafe vehicles, 
$141.6 billion for injuries and accidents in unsafe workplaces, and 
$274.7 billion for cancer deaths caused by toxic exposure in the work-
place.126 In total and adjusting for inflation to 2017 dollars, these four 
product categories represent an estimated $897 billion in externaliza-
tion costs, or around 4 to 5 percent of GDP. 
 
 118. ESTES, supra note 12, at 172. 
 119. Id. at 173. 
 120. Id. at 177–78. 
 121. Id. at 177. 
 122. Id. at 173.  
 123. Id. at 182. 
 124. Id. at 173.  
 125. See DAVID C. KORTEN, THE POST-CORPORATE WORLD: LIFE AFTER CAPITALISM 46–
83 (1999); CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 116. 
 126. KORTEN, supra note 125, at 48. 
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Even if Estes’s estimate is too high by a factor of five, it still sug-
gests that the magnitude of externalization is large enough to cancel 
out annual economic growth as measured by GDP.127 This merits poli-
cymakers’ attention. 
Some might argue that limited liability only facilitates externaliza-
tion when a company becomes insolvent. Because corporate insolven-
cies are relatively rare, one might think that the role of limited liability 
in externalization is small. But this line of reasoning overlooks the role 
of potential insolvency and the limits of successor liability in deterring 
plaintiffs. Actual insolvency is unnecessary for limited liability to facil-
itate loss externalization. The mere specter of liability pushing a firm 
to the brink of insolvency might persuade regulators, courts, and plain-
tiffs to agree to lower damages, or forgo litigation altogether, rather 
than expend resources seeking damages that would be uncollectible.128 
Companies’ existence often ends with an asset sale rather than an 
insolvency. Following the asset sale, proceeds are distributed to target 
company investors, and the target company dissolves. In most jurisdic-
tions, asset purchasers do not take on successor liability.129 Neverthe-
less, cautious acquirers often use an acquisition subsidiary—which pro-
vides a liability shield to the parent company—to mitigate the risks of 
successor liability. Limited liability reduces the risk of claimants in-
jured by the target pursuing the acquirer of the target’s assets. Thus, 
limited liability facilitates externalization even in the absence of corpo-
rate insolvency. 
III.  PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
Several policy tools have been proposed to address the judgment-
proof problem when dealing with activities that are known ex ante to 
be risky, including safety regulation, minimum asset requirements, and 
compulsory insurance.130 These tools could arguably also be used to ad-
dress the broader risk of externalization through limited liability, but 
 
 127. Since 1990, U.S. real GDP growth has averaged around 2.5 percent per year. Real Gross 
Domestic Product, FRED: ECON. DATA (July 27, 2018), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ 
A191RL1A225NBEA [https://perma.cc/TFH6-AGGZ]. 
 128. See Merritt & Barry, supra note 60.  
 129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 12 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998); Asset Pur-
chase Agreement Commentary, PRACTICAL LAW CORP. & SEC., Westlaw (last visited July 3, 2018) 
https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-381-0590. 
 130. Shavell, Liability for Harm, supra note 32, at 357; Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Re-
quirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, 36 
RAND J. ECON. 63, 63–77 (2005) [hereinafter Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements].  
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each tool comes with limitations and offers an incomplete solution. It 
is particularly difficult to use these tools to address risks that are un-
known or unknowable. It is not always feasible to identify in advance 
which activities are risky.131 
A. Unlimited liability is limited by collection challenges 
Providing for unlimited investor liability—in a way that would be 
difficult for investors to circumvent and that would facilitate substan-
tial recoveries—is challenging. Restricting limited liability seems at-
tractive because retroactive assessments against investors could be pro-
portionate to the damages caused and the risks taken. The level of risk 
and potential harm may be difficult to determine ex ante, but easier to 
determine ex post. As a practical matter, however, ex post unlimited 
liability entails serious challenges of collections and enforcement. The 
prospect of unlimited liability could also exacerbate information prob-
lems and capital structure conflict among investors.132 However, these 
problems can be mitigated if unlimited liability for torts (and tort-like 
civil penalties) is proportionate rather than joint and several.133 Cir-
cumvention efforts via exotic structures can be curtailed if proportion-
ate liability applies broadly to all financial investors.134 
However, the practical challenges of gathering information about 
and collecting judgments from international investors (or U.S. inves-
tors investing through foreign corporations) are not as large or insur-
mountable as is often assumed.135 Much of the information that would 
be needed has already been gathered through international coopera-
tion to stymie funding for terrorism, prevent money laundering, and 
curb tax evasion.136 The U.S. and European Union (“E.U.”) have suc-
cessfully pressured tax havens—including those with bank secrecy 
laws—to reveal information about investors and thereby facilitate en-
forcement of U.S. law and the laws of large E.U. member states.137 If 
 
 131. Levitin, supra note 19, at 452 (arguing that whether a firm is too big to fail is “inherently 
speculative”).  
 132. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  
 133. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra Part II.E.  
 135. Contra Grundfest, supra note 101, at 398 (“Simply identifying foreign shareholders and 
locating their assets can be daunting.”); id. at n.44 (“Identifying foreign owners can be virtually 
impossible when ownership must be traced through bearer shares, such as those issued by Liech-
tenstein . . . or when ownership is held through accounts in jurisdictions with bank secrecy laws.”). 
 136. See JAMES K. JACKSON, THE OECD INITIATIVE ON TAX HAVENS 1, 6 (2010).  
 137. Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the 
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necessary, the U.S. and E.U. can bring significant economic and polit-
ical pressure to bear on smaller states, which usually results in those 
states cooperating with law enforcement efforts.138 
Another problem is that unlimited liability removes the insurance-
like benefits of limited liability for risk-averse investors. Although in-
vestors or firms can voluntarily insure some risks privately, risks that 
are not yet well-understood may not be privately insurable. In addition, 
the insurance company may face its own solvency challenges if large 
harms materialize. 
B. Safety regulation is limited by regulators’ knowledge of which 
activities are unsafe 
Safety regulation is an attractive approach for managing risks 
when regulators have good information about the nature of the risks, 
precautions that can be undertaken to reduce those risks, and how the 
costs and benefits of various precautions compare to one another.139 
Regulation may be particularly attractive when regulators have spe-
cialized technical knowledge beyond that possessed by most private 
parties, and economies of scale in acquiring and maintaining that 
knowledge.140 In particular instances, however, private actors may have 
better information than regulators about risk. When private actors 
have better information than regulators, liability and other methods of 
internalizing costs should move industry closer to the optimal risk lev-
els.141 
 
G20 Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 65, 69 (2014). 
 138. Michael A. Berger, Not So Safe Haven: Reducing Tax Evasion by Regulation Corre-
spondent Banks Operating in the United States, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L., 51, 80–81 (2014). 
 139. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address 
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 128 (2013) (noting that “(1) the more 
confident regulators are in their ability to model the dynamics of the financial system, (2) the 
more controls exist for regulating systemically significant activities, and (3) the more capable reg-
ulators are at implementing their policies without giving rise to substantial market inefficiencies 
or regulatory arbitrage,” the more regulators should use ex ante regulation); Levitin, supra note 
19, at 439, 461–78 (describing challenges and limitations of ex ante approaches to reducing sys-
temic risk in financial and nonfinancial firms); Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1724 (2015) (“With perfect government information, perfectly rational ac-
tors, and complete liquidity, ex post is equivalent to ex ante. . . . In the case of a manufacturer or 
retailer that expects subsequent liability, the present discounted value of the expected future lia-
bility becomes part of the costs of production.”); Shavell, Liability for Harm, supra note 32, at 
368–71. 
 140. Shavell, Liability for Harm, supra note 32, at 369.  
 141. Id. at 366–67.  
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C. Minimum asset requirements reduce competition 
Minimum asset requirements might inefficiently prevent parties 
with low assets from engaging in socially beneficial activities and could 
inefficiently reduce entrepreneurship and competition.142 While this 
side effect might not be particularly troubling if the policy were exclu-
sively applied to activities known to be high-risk, broadly applying min-
imum asset requirements whenever limited liability is utilized could 
have much greater economic consequences. 
D. Insurance requires measurable risk and policing moral hazard 
Private insurance is generally not readily available for unknown 
or unknowable risks. Insurers generally prefer to underwrite insurance 
for well-understood, specific, and readily quantifiable risks for which 
historical data is available—that is, risks that resemble those that have 
materialized in the past.143 Compulsory insurance is attractive when it 
is possible for insurers to observe differences in risk levels and levels 
of care across insured parties and adjust the cost of insurance accord-
ingly. Risk-adjusted premiums can affect both the decision about 
whether to engage in a risky activity and the level of care to take if 
engaging in the activity.144 However, if premiums are not risk-adjusted, 
insurance can introduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
and blunt incentives to take precautions once insured.145 
Mandatory insurance also does not eliminate the judgment-proof 
problem, but rather shifts it up the chain to the insurance company.146 
During the financial crisis of 2008, several insurance companies that 
took on correlated mortgage risks, such as monoline insurers and AIG, 
 
 142. Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements, supra note 130, at 64–65. The problem is more 
severe when the ability to raise capital is constrained, for example because of information prob-
lems or other frictions in the capital markets. 
 143. Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insuring Against Catastrophe, in THE KNOWN, THE 
UNKNOWN, AND THE UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT: MEASUREMENT AND 
THEORY ADVANCING PRACTICE 210, 211 (Francis X. Diebold, Neil A. Doherty & Richard J. 
Herring eds., 2010); Boardman, supra note 9, at 784. 
 144. Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insur-
ance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571–628 (2016); Hanson & Logue, supra note 18, at 1268–80. 
 145. Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements, supra note 130, at 64–65. 
 146. Cf. Boardman, supra note 9, at 806, 807, 809, 812 (noting that mandatory insurance re-
quired under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act merely shifts the risk to insurance companies, 
who are compensated by the federal government in case of insolvency). 
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faced their own solvency challenges which ultimately led to post hoc 
liquidity support from the federal government.147 
Even if private insurance is not enough by itself, why should pri-
vate insurance not play a larger role and supplant the role of the gov-
ernment in providing limited liability, to the extent possible? As previ-
ously noted, private insurance companies only provide insurance for 
specific, well-understood and clearly defined risks for which there is 
actuarial information available. Insurance companies need this infor-
mation to price premiums and ensure profitability. Insurance contracts 
contain exclusions to make the insured risks highly specific. Private in-
surers only provide insurance up to specified limits of coverage. 
In contrast, limited liability is effectively all-purpose insurance for 
anything that might go wrong with no coverage limit—the effective 
limit is all of the nonexempt assets of the investors. Limited liability 
covers gaps that private insurance does not cover. Private insurance 
could serve as a fallback for companies that think limited liability is too 
expensive, but it would likely be inferior and chosen solely for its lower 
cost. 
Relying on a private insurance company raises questions. Who in-
sures the insurance company? What happens when the insurance com-
pany becomes insolvent? If one believes that private insurers are more 
competent than government agencies at pricing even poorly under-
stood risk, one possible approach to harness their expertise would be 
to require private insurance for specific tranches of risk (for example, 
private insurance to cover 5 percent of the first $1 billion in risk, 5 per-
cent of the billion between $10 billion and $11 billion, and so on). How-
ever, if the tranches were too large, the private insurance company 
would risk insolvency. If tranches were too small, there would be little 
incentive for the insurance company to invest in pricing risk appropri-
ately. 
If rates for a small tranche of private insurance were used to price 
a much larger government limited liability program, then diversified 
insurers who serve large corporate clients in many capacities would 
have strong incentives to undercharge for a small amount of limited 
 
 147. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Deriva-
tive Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (2010); Michael Simkovic, Com-
petition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 213 (2013); Michael Simkovic, Se-
cret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 283–89 (2009); Squire, supra 
note 67. 
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liability insurance. The insured could covertly compensate private in-
surance companies for misleading the government by providing coop-
erating insurance companies larger, more lucrative insurance contracts 
in other areas. This is analogous to the conflicts of interest that plague 
auditors who provide lucrative consulting work to their auditing cli-
ents, investment banking analysts who cover client companies, or credit 
rating agencies that compete with one another to provide lucrative ser-
vices to issuers. Related problems recently arose in the Hovnanian 
case, 148 in which a buyer of credit-default-swap protection allegedly 
paid an issuer to manipulate the pricing of a small number of bonds, 
which were used to price the much larger market for credit derivatives 
referencing Hovnanian securities.149 
Private insurance would not reveal information about private risk 
estimates in the same way that elections within a public program could, 
even under the best of circumstances in which there were mandatory 
disclosure of insurance rates, terms, and underwriting criteria. How-
ever, requiring private insurers to disclose their pricing, terms, and cli-
ent bases, and banning conflicting lines of business would make limited 
liability insurance an extremely unattractive line of business. In sum, 
the advantages of basing pricing for limited liability on private insur-
ance rates may be outweighed by greater complexity, conflicts of inter-
est, and reduced transparency. 
IV.  A PROPOSED SOLUTION: LIMITED LIABILITY AS AN 
INFORMATION-FORCING MECHANISM 
Limited liability as it currently exists operates as uncapped, mis-
priced insurance. Beneficiaries of limited liability are provided protec-
tion from risks, regardless of their likelihood or potential costs, for free. 
This results in an externalization problem that solutions such as regu-
lation, mandatory insurance, and minimum capital requirements can 
help mitigate, but only insofar as policymakers understand industry-
specific risks. 
A solution is to use limited liability as an information-forcing 
mechanism. By charging firms for limited liability, private entities 
would be forced to reveal information about industry-specific risks to 
 
 148. Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP v. GSO Capital Partners, L.P., No. 18 CV. 232-LTS-BCM, 
2018 WL 620490 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018). 
 149. Id. at *2–3, *5–9; Robert K. Rasmussen & Michael Simkovic, Fairness Without Standards 
8–9 (Aug. 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Duke Law Journal) (explaining the 
Hovnanian deal structure). 
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policymakers. The charge, if well-calibrated to risk levels, could also 
help compensate the public fisc for risks, thereby reducing the exter-
nalization problem. 
For a limited liability charge to operate as an information-forcing 
mechanism, three features would be very helpful. First, the cost of opt-
ing into limited liability should be determined iteratively to allow reg-
ulators to reprice limited liability in subsequent periods based on infor-
mation received in the previous period. Second, because the most 
obvious correlate of externalization risk is probably size or activity 
level, the appropriate tax base is the greater of revenue or expendi-
tures. Third, non-risk-related factors that could influence a firm’s elec-
tion—investor wealth, risk aversion, agency costs, capital structure, 
and positive externalities—should be considered. 
A. Dynamic, iterative pricing of the unknown 
The goal of a limited liability tax is to target risks of harm that may 
be externalized to third parties. Pricing the unknown is inherently chal-
lenging, particularly when regulators and tax authorities have far less 
information than industry participants and sophisticated investors. 
Conventional approaches to measuring risk used in finance and 
the asset pricing literature are of limited usefulness because these 
measures are meant to assess risk to investors—either shareholders or 
creditors—who enjoy limited liability.150 When investors enjoy limited 
liability, they will only consider risks up to the value of their invest-
ment, not risks of harm that can be externalized to the general public.151 
The fact that risks are not known and are not precisely quantifiable 
does not mean that nothing should be done to address them. We can 
 
 150. For example, some scholars have proposed that courts and regulators use market indica-
tors of risk, such as credit spreads, to detect risks that have not yet materialized and are not readily 
observable. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institu-
tions, 13 AM. L. ECON REV. 453, 487–88 (2011) (proposing an equity capital requirement that 
relies on CDS prices rather than credit rating agencies); Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 48, 
at 166–68 (proposing that courts focus on credit spreads rather than bond prices or yields); Mi-
chael Simkovic, Making Fraudulent Transfer Law More Predictable 157 (Seton Hall Law Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2775920 
[https://perma.cc/H8PC-WVGN]; Michael Simkovic, The Evolution of Valuation in Bankruptcy, 
91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 301, 307 (2017). Markets, imperfect though they may be, tend to be better at 
aggregating information and predicting the future than many alternatives. However, credit 
spreads and other financial-market-based indicators of risk can account for risks only to the extent 
that those risks would be borne by creditors or other investors. 
 151. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. Market participants focus only on their 
own bottom lines and not on externalities. Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Eco-
nomic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 94 (1995). 
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safely assume that the costs of externalized risks—and the commensu-
rate benefits to investors and employees—are greater than zero. Thus, 
even a modest countervailing policy could be an improvement over the 
status quo. 
Industry participants’ choice to pay the proposed fee for limited 
liability or forgo protection will reveal information to policymakers 
and regulators about knowledgeable parties’ internal assessments of 
risk. Indeed, the requirement that firms and investors make choices 
with respect to limited liability—difficult choices that entail substantial 
financial tradeoffs—will encourage firms and investors to gather infor-
mation and assess risks that they might otherwise ignore. 
When limited liability comes at a cost, those who believe that they 
are engaged in riskier activities will be more likely to opt into limited 
liability, while those who believe their actions are comparatively be-
nign will be more likely to forgo it.152 If limited liability were priced 
uniformly relative to scale, then variation in the proportion of similar 
firms that opted into limited liability would reveal information about 
private assessments of the relative riskiness of various activities. As-
sume risks are nearly uniform within a group of similar firms, but in-
formation about risk and perceptions of risks still vary among members 
of the group.153 Thus, elections regarding limited liability aggregate and 
reveal information about risk, much as market pricing or prediction 
markets aggregate and reveal information.154 Regulators could use this 
information to more closely study and eventually regulate or insure 
high-risk activities. 
Regulators could also iteratively reprice limited liability in subse-
quent periods, charging different prices to different risk-pooled groups 
of firms based on information revealed in the previous period. Thus, a 
risk-uniform group in which relatively few or no firms opted into lim-
ited liability in the previous period—thereby signaling relatively low 
risk for the group—would see the price of limited liability fall in the 
next period. On the other hand, a risk-uniform group in which a very 
 
 152. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 26, at 98–100; Raskolnikov, supra note 26, at 691. 
 153. In other words, risks are uniformly distributed within each group, but perceptions of risk 
are nonuniformly distributed. A simplifying assumption is that such information is normally dis-
tributed. 
 154. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 28, at 585–86 (discussing how price equilibration for 
innovative securities proceeds rapidly as more traders become informed); Grossman, supra note 
28 (discussing how the equilibrium price summarizes the aggregate of all the information in a 
competitive market); Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 28, at 112 (describing how prediction mar-
kets have outperformed polling organizations in the political domain). 
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large proportion of firms opted into limited liability—thereby signaling 
relatively high risk—would see the price of limited liability increase in 
subsequent periods. Limited liability during each period would cover 
harm arising out of activities undertaken during the period. Because 
the benefits of making the proper election are fully internalized by in-
dividual firms, whereas the costs of future regulation or limited liability 
tax changes will be borne collectively by the group (i.e., competitors 
within an industry), firms will be unlikely to strategically mislead poli-
cymakers through their elections.155 
When prices are set such that similar firms are close to equally 
likely to choose limited liability or forgo it, we can infer that the cost of 
limited liability is priced roughly at its value.156 At this point, differ-
ences in the price of limited liability for different categories of firms 
would be a good indicator of differences in residual risk that are known 
or suspected by industry participants, but unknown to regulators or the 
public. These price adjustments constitute an optimization process, and 
it therefore makes sense to initially price at a “best guess” of where the 
price will eventually settle. In light of (admittedly tentative) estimates 
that the externalization problem could amount to around 4 to 5 percent 
of GDP, it may be sensible to initially price limited liability at least at 
4 to 5 percent of revenue.157 
Costly limited liability will require both managers and investors to 
assist with risk assessment. If limited liability is costly enough, firms 
will invest resources in understanding risks they would otherwise ig-
nore, to better understand whether limited liability is worth the price. 
If a firm overpays for limited liability, then investors may decline to 
invest, sell their holdings, or short sell the company and publicize its 
shortcomings; firms that agree to overpay for acquisitions will often see 
their share price decline when the deal is announced.158  
Alternatively, investors might reject a decision by management to 
forgo limited liability. If a firm elects unlimited liability against the bet-
ter judgment of investors, those investors could sell their holdings (or 
 
 155. Collusion becomes more plausible if the group is very small and/or the industry is highly 
consolidated. 
 156. If one assumes some risk aversion, then the optimal price may be one at which more than 
half of firms choose limited liability, though not all. If all firms choose limited liability, that would 
be a clear sign that limited liability is underpriced.  
 157. See supra Part II.F. 
 158. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Do Managerial Objectives Drive 
Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31, 31 (1990) (noting that shareholders experience a decline in wealth 
when managers overpay in acquisitions). 
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short sell). Or investors could place their holdings in a limited liability 
vehicle. Passive investors who place their holdings in a limited liability 
vehicle would simply pay their pro rata share of the limited liability 
fee—that is, what the portfolio company would have paid on their be-
half had it elected limited liability. Activist investors might have to pay 
an additional fee for limited liability to reflect additional risks associ-
ated with their activities.159 The portfolio company would be recorded 
for purposes of iterative pricing as if it was partially limited liability and 
partially unlimited liability based on the share of total firm value held 
by investors who opted for limited liability. Thus, an investor would be 
able to unilaterally override managers’ choice to forgo limited liability 
with respect to the investor’s own holdings. Decisions by insiders to use 
private insurance or place their own shares in limited liability entities 
would implicate fiduciary duties and mandatory disclosure require-
ments. 
Investors and active money managers would likely independently 
gather information and form their own judgments. When enough 
money is at stake, activist investors, arbitrageurs, and short sellers use 
information-gathering techniques such as interviews with former em-
ployees, customers, vendors, and suppliers. Investors purchase propri-
etary data and engage outside experts to analyze it. Some investors use 
even more exotic approaches to information gathering such as drone 
surveillance or consultancies staffed with experienced intelligence of-
ficers.160 The worse the decisions made by managers, and the more 
money to be made correcting or exploiting those bad decisions, the 
more resources investors will deploy to gather information. 
For the purpose of grouping firms, a natural starting point would 
be extant classification systems, such as the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS).161 NAICS and its predecessor, the 
 
 159. Passive investors do not attempt to alter how a firm is governed, but rather attempt to 
select firms that will perform well. Activist investors use a variety of tactics to try to change cor-
porate strategy and to benefit themselves (though not necessarily the rest of the shareholders). 
Some of these tactics can create liability risk for the activist investor. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn 
Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1258, 1260–61 (2008). 
 160. Eamon Javers, Accountants and Spies: The Secret History of Deloitte’s Espionage Prac-
tice, CNBC (Dec. 19, 2016, 10:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/19/accountants-and-spies-
the-secret-history-of-deloittes-espionage-practice.html [https://perma.cc/6E2L-754N]; Madison 
Marriage, Hedge Funds Turn to Spy Technology, FIN. TIMES (Sept.  
15, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/228bfc86-1c91-11e3-8894-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/ 
2T3P-86EV].  
 161. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (2017) 
[hereinafter NAICS].  
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Standard Industry Classification system (SIC), are widely used by the 
federal government for data collection and are also used by investors. 
NAICS is updated every five years as new technologies develop and 
new industries emerge.162 It is also compatible with the International 
Standard Industrial Classification system (ISIC).163 
Regulators may be able to risk-pool firms only imperfectly; firms 
within a group will inevitably be less than perfectly uniform. But this 
too can be an information-forcing mechanism that could lead to dy-
namic improvements over time. Low-risk firms that are mistakenly 
grouped with high-risk firms have incentives to reveal industry-specific 
information that can help regulators and policymakers better distin-
guish between high-risk and low-risk firms. 
Whatever price is initially implemented for a limited liability tax 
will divide the population of taxpaying businesses into three groups: 
(1) those for whom the tax is lower than the perceived value of limited 
liability, and who therefore will choose a limited liability entity and pay 
the tax; (2) those for whom the tax is higher than the value of limited 
liability, and who will therefore do business without the benefits of lim-
ited liability (but perhaps with more private insurance than they would 
otherwise use); and (3) those for whom the tax is higher than the value 
of limited liability, and who will refuse to do business without the ben-
efits of limited liability. The decision by Group (3) firms to not do busi-
ness will likely improve efficiency by shutting down socially harmful 
firms.164 
 
 162. Id. at 3; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NAICS UPDATE PROCESS FACTSHEET 1, https://www. 
census.gov/eos/www/naics/reference_files_tools/NAICS_Update_Process_Fact_Sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UL8D-EE62].  
 163. NAICS, supra note 161, at 3; UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF ALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES (ISIC) 37 (rev. 4, 2008), https://un-
stats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_4rev4e.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQF7-JYS7].  
 164. This is likely as long as either investors are not risk averse or the firm or its investors can 
seek private insurance as an alternative to limited liability. If investors are risk neutral or risk-
seeking and have decided that a business is not attractive—whether they pay for limited liability 
or forgo it—then the business is likely socially harmful and should not operate. Thus, shifting 
some businesses into Group (3) will increase efficiency by shutting down socially harmful busi-
nesses.  
However, if Group (3) firms’ investors are risk averse, then Group (3) firms or their inves-
tors could seek private insurance in lieu of limited liability. Only if all private insurance companies 
were unwilling to insure risks at a lower cost than the government—and were all mistaken in this 
decision—would overcharging for limited liability create a deadweight loss. To obtain private in-
surance, firms would likely have to be extremely specific about which risks they wished to insure 
and would therefore need to reveal information to private insurance companies. Investors would 
also have to feel confident that risks would be below insurance coverage limits and that the insur-
ance company could remain solvent. These are serious shortcomings, but private insurance could 
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There will be a margin for error in pricing where taxpayers are risk 
averse, because the value risk-averse taxpayers place on limited liabil-
ity will be higher than the cost to the government of providing limited 
liability (i.e., the cost of absorbing additional externalized losses), just 
as the insured value insurance more than it costs the insurance com-
pany to provide it. If policymakers believe that investors are risk averse 
and that private insurance is unavailable because private insurance 
companies are also irrationally risk averse, then the optimal proportion 
of firms electing limited liability would be more than half. The optimal 
proportion would be larger depending on the degree of investor risk 
aversion assumed. 
The limited liability tax could improve on the status quo for both 
Groups (1) and (2) by forcing them to internalize more costs and 
providing fewer opportunities for externalization. Group (1) will inter-
nalize part of the cost by paying a tax, while Group (2) will internalize 
costs by paying more in judgments. Firms’ choices about which group 
to join can convey important information to regulators. 
If firms choose to transition between limited liability and unlim-
ited liability in future periods, investors in transitioning firms may seek 
to liquidate their positions. Changes in the market price of firms would 
also reveal information about investors’ assessments of risk. This ap-
proach might put pressure on the agency relationship between manag-
ers and investors. Managers might have incentives to either exaggerate 
or understate externalization risks, depending on their own levels of 
risk aversion. Nevertheless, U.S. corporate and securities laws, and so-
phisticated investors generally, are effective at monitoring managers, 
aligning their interests with investors, and policing agency costs. Cor-
porate law is a strong enough pillar to support risk discovery. 
Thus, the limited liability tax is an information-forcing mechanism 
that encourages businesses to publicly reveal private information about 
the risks of externalization inherent in their businesses.165 Lawmakers, 
regulators, and insurers can therefore focus more of their attention on 
Group (1) entities that have identified themselves as high risk.166 While 
 
nevertheless provide a less expensive—and less attractive—alternative to limited liability, which 
could mitigate the danger of the government overcharging for limited liability. 
 165. See, e.g., Raskolnikov, supra note 26, at 691 (proposing information-forcing and self-sort-
ing mechanisms in tax enforcement).  
 166. Regulatory focus on individual firms that opt into limited liability would likely be priced 
into individual firms’ decisions about entity selection. However, if regulators and insurers note 
the mix of firms that opt into limited liability versus unlimited liability by industry or activity type, 
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the limited liability tax will be mispriced at any given point in time, it 
can accelerate the risk-discovery process. Thus, it will increase dynamic 
efficiency and provide long-term benefits. 
B. Choosing a tax base to scale firms 
The iterative approach to taxing limited liability outlined above 
requires that similar firms be grouped together. To form larger groups, 
it is helpful to scale limited liability tax rates by firms of different size 
to arrive at different tax liabilities. If two firms are engaged in activities 
that are similarly risky, but one firm’s activities are more extensive, the 
firm engaged in more extensive activities should pay a greater tax. This 
is fundamentally a question of the appropriate tax base. For reasons 
explained in greater detail below, the appropriate measure of activity, 
and therefore the appropriate tax base, is probably the greater of rev-
enue or expenditures. 
The most obvious correlate of externalization risk is probably size 
or activity level. All else being equal, a larger business enterprise, more 
actively engaged in the economy, is likely to produce larger losses in a 
downside scenario than a much smaller, less active enterprise. Larger 
aggregate losses are probably more likely to lead to government inter-
vention than smaller ones (although a network of small enterprises en-
gaging in similar activities could, in the aggregate, generate large ex-
ternalized losses). 
1. The greater of revenue or expenditures.  Revenue has many 
advantages as a measure of size and economic activity. Revenue 
reflects the value that the market is willing to pay for the total output 
of a firm on an annual basis. In the absence of specific information that 
certain activities are riskier than others per unit of revenue, revenue 
seems like a sensible starting place for sizing risk. Unlike profit and 
income, revenue does not depend on capital structure—regardless of 
the mix of debt or equity, revenue remains constant. Unlike income,167 
revenue is not easy to alter through simple accounting manipulations, 
such as characterizing certain cash outlays as current expenses or 
disguising dividends or personal consumption as business expenses. 
 
and increased policing and monitoring of those industries and activities across entity types, col-
lective action problems would preclude too much gamesmanship by firms with respect to entity 
selection.  
 167. See Hamill, supra note 5, at 415–19 (discussing closely held corporations’ generally suc-
cessful attempts to bring taxable corporate income down to nearly zero by boosting deductible 
expenses). 
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Indeed, revenue-sharing agreements have often been used to co-
ordinate activity across firms in a supply chain.168 Some analyses sug-
gest that revenue sharing could have advantages over profit sharing in 
many contexts.169 
Some scholars have also argued that a heavy income tax does not 
discourage risk-taking as long as there are full loss offsets and taxpay-
ers can adjust their portfolios in response to the tax.170 A revenue tax, 
unlike an income tax, does not feature loss offsets of any kind. There-
fore, it may be sensible to structure a limited liability tax as a percent-
age of the revenue of any entity that confers limited liability on its in-
vestors. 
However, firms will only have revenue if they have customers. 
Firms might undertake risky investment activities in early stages when 
they have no revenue. For such firms, cost may be a better measure of 
size of economic activity. Therefore, the greater of revenue or cost may 
be the best available tax base. 
Tax scholars concerned only with raising revenue to fund public 
programs tend to frown on revenue taxes because revenue taxes disad-
vantage low-margin firms and therefore are more likely than income 
taxes to discourage low-margin but profitable firms from operating.171 
However, for the purpose of risk assessment, the features of revenue 
taxes are advantageous. A low-margin firm produces relatively little 
value per unit of activity. Therefore, even small negative externalities 
can render a low-margin firm’s operation socially harmful. In addition, 
the limited liability tax will be priced as the percentage of revenue for 
similar firms based on their collective willingness to pay for limited li-
ability. Depending on the type of firm, the percentage will vary. It is 
 
 168. Gérard P. Cachon & Martin A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-
Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, 51 MGMT. SCI. 30, 31 (2005). 
 169. David E. M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, Revenue Sharing in Incentive Regulation 
Plans, 8 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 229, 232–35 (1996). 
 170. Mitchell A. Kane, Risk and Redistribution in Open and Closed Economies, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 867, 867–70 (2006); J. E. Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation 
on Risk-Taking, 83 Q. J. ECON. 263, 263 (1969); David Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with 
Multiple Tax Rates, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 229, 229 (2004); see also John R. Brooks II, Taxation, Risk, 
and Portfolio Choice: The Treatment of Returns to Risk Under a Normative Income Tax, 66 TAX 
L. REV. 255, 255–57 (2012) (noting that investors adjust the risk allocation of their portfolios to 
reduce tax liability).  
 171. Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 925, 929 (1967); Andrew Chamberlain & Patrick Fleenor, Tax Pyramiding: The 
Economic Consequences of Gross Receipt Taxes, SPECIAL REP. (Tax Found., Washington, D.C.), 
Dec. 2006, at 8–9. 
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therefore unlikely that particular kinds of firms would be disadvan-
taged except to the extent that they collectively believe that their ac-
tivities are likely to lead to actionable externalized harm. 
Several measures of size are often used in accounting and finance 
studies: revenue, number of employees, value of assets, or possibly firm 
value (e.g., enterprise value).172 An explanation of why other tax bases 
are less desirable follows. 
2. Income or profit.  The corporate income tax is often understood 
as a withholding tax necessitated by the impracticality of collecting 
from individual investors,173 but it is not tied to limited liability nor is it 
well calibrated to risk levels.174 There is no particular reason to believe 
that a firm that is more profitable, and therefore has a higher income, 
is more active or engaged in greater risk-taking activities than firms 
that are less profitable or run at a loss. Income is therefore not the 
appropriate tax base. 
Profit is not a very good measure of firm size because very large 
companies can have low profits or operate at a loss. Profits or operating 
losses in one year do not necessarily support inferences about the risk 
of externalization because profits are influenced by many factors other 
than overall activity level and expenditures on  risk-mitigating 
measures.175 
For the purpose of the extant corporate income tax, net income or 
profits can be reduced substantially without changing operations by re-
capitalizing the company—replacing equity with debt and dividends 
with interest payments. For practical purposes, the two forms of capital 
may be close to functionally equivalent, and there are no strong rea-
sons to believe that more highly leveraged firms are less likely to ex-
ternalize losses.176 To the contrary, a firm with more secured debt may 
 
 172. Osamah M. Al-Khazali & Taisier A. Zoubi, Empirical Testing of Different Alternative 
Proxy Measures for Firm Size, 21 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 79, 79 (2011); S. S. Shalit & U. Sankar, 
The Measurement of Firm Size, 59 REV. ECON. & STAT. 290, 294 (1977). None of these size 
measures typically determines corporate tax liability. Instead, corporate tax liability rises with 
taxable income, which roughly corresponds to corporate profit. 
 173. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate 
Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (2004); Bank, supra note 88, at 897.  
 174. Avi-Yonah, supra note 173, at 1206. 
 175. William R. Gebhardt, Charles M. C. Lee & Bhaskaran Swaminathan, Toward an Implied 
Cost of Capital, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 135, 154 (2001). 
 176. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 81, at 322–23 (arguing that the presence of debt can 
encourage greater risk-taking by equity holders to extract value from bondholders through asset 
substitution); Mark Roe, Brown-Vitter Cannot Fix US Banks by Itself, FIN. TIMES (May 15,  
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be more capable of externalizing losses because secured creditors have 
higher-priority claims on assets of the firm than tort claimants and 
other involuntary creditors.177 Thus, a tax tied to corporate income, as 
conventionally defined under the internal revenue code, would be a 
poor proxy for risk. 
Another widely used proxy for risk is earnings variability.178 The 
intuition is that earnings are likely to track cash flow and that greater 
swings on the upside imply the potential for greater swings on the 
downside.179 Very large downside swings could create opportunities for 
risk externalization. 
A traditional corporate income tax generally does not tax busi-
nesses with more volatile earnings more heavily than those with more 
consistent earnings because of opportunities to smooth taxable in-
come. For example, companies can carry back or carry forward net op-
erating losses.180 Although not all losses are usable, most are.181 With 
full offsets of losses, the federal government is effectively a partner in 
risk-taking,182 and the corporate income tax will not do much to dis-
courage excessive risk-taking resulting from limited liability. 
In contrast, a limited liability tax, structured so that firms cannot 
offset losses, would fall more heavily on businesses engaged in riskier 
activities. All else being equal, these might also be the businesses with 
 
2013), https://www.ft.com/content/3d9f5954-bd51-11e2-a735-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/ 
RZ7P-4RT9] (“[T]he US corporate tax system is perversely biased towards debt and against eq-
uity. It allows for tax deductions of debt interest payments while taxing shareholder profits.”); cf. 
Hayne E. Leland, Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure, 53 J. FIN. 1213, 1237 
(1998) (“[A]gency costs of debt related to asset substitution are far less than the tax advantages 
of debt.”). 
 177. Douglas G. Baird, Importance of Priority, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1429−31 (1997); cf. 
Listokin, supra note 33, at 1067–68 (finding that secured debt is used primarily to reduce agency 
costs and not to redistribute value from tort claimants).  
 178. Gebhardt, Lee & Swaminathan, supra note 175, at 146, 154 (noting that earnings varia-
bility is often regarded by financial practitioners “as a source of risk for firm valuation” and “is 
likely to capture fundamental cash flow risk.”).  
 179. Brooks, supra note 170, at 258–59 (discussing the traditional view of variance as a proxy 
for risk and alternate conceptions of risk that are focused on potential losses rather than volatil-
ity). 
 180. Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 
76 NW. U. L. REV. 709, 715–16 (1981); Jacob Nussim & Avraham Tabbach, Tax-Loss Mechanisms, 
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1509, 1511–18 (2014).  
 181. Michael Cooper & Matthew Knittel, Partial Loss Refundability: How Are Corporate Tax 
Losses Used?, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 651, 651–52 (2006). 
 182. Kane, supra note 170, at 869–70. 
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the greatest risk of externalizing losses to the public fisc.183 Thus, a rev-
enue tax without loss offsets might be preferable for a limited liability 
tax. 
It should be noted that the extant corporate income tax is not a tax 
on limited liability calibrated to the risk of externalization. Limited li-
ability for owners is currently available without corporate taxes for 
firms using certain structures that are typically practical only when 
there are few owners.184 These structures include S-Corporations, pri-
vately held LLCs, and privately held partnerships. Even before LLCs 
and LLPs became widely available in the 1990s, limited liability was 
available to equity investors with minimal corporate tax through the 
use of a limited partnership with a corporate general partner. Limited 
liability with respect to tort claimants has long been available to 
debtholders, regardless of the choice of entity used to organize the 
firm. 
If an LLC or a partnership becomes publicly traded, the firm can 
more readily access capital from many investors, each of whom need 
only contribute a small fraction of his or her assets. The cost of such 
access to capital is that these entities are generally subject to corporate 
taxation. However, there are exceptions for publicly traded LLCs and 
partnerships engaged in certain activities. Many of these exempt activ-
ities—real estate, energy, and natural resource extraction and trans-
portation—may be high risk.185 
 
 183. This is because greater volatility over a limited range of risk could also suggest a greater 
likelihood of more extreme losses. 
 184. The corporate income tax is imposed on C-corporations and on publicly traded partner-
ships and LLCs, but not on closely held S-corporations or on partnerships or LLCs that are not 
publicly traded. I.R.C. § 7704(a)–(b) (2011) (stating that publicly traded LLCs and partnerships 
are taxed as corporations); Bank, supra note 88, at 943; Hamill, supra note 5, at 394, 397–98, 410, 
413, 421 n.137, 423–24; Eric B. Sloan & Matthew W. Lay, Beyond the Master Limited Partnership: 
A Comprehensive Review of Publicly Traded Partnerships, 88 TAX MAG. 229, 229–30 (2010).  
 185. There are numerous exceptions under I.R.C. § 7704 for publicly traded partnerships en-
gaged in certain kinds of activities, or multitier entities including real estate investment trusts, 
regulated investment companies, and oil and gas and other mineral extraction activities. I.R.C. § 
7704(c)–(d) (2011); Sloan & Lay, supra note 184, at 232, 243. The latter exception may be ironic 
given widespread belief that extractive industries that increase greenhouse gas emissions have 
opportunities to externalize losses. Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and 
Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 145, 148–49 (2013). 
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3. Number of employees.  The number of employees of a firm is 
not an ideal measure of risk because some industries are more capital 
intensive or have higher output per employee than others.186 
4. Assets.  The value of a firm’s assets is an unsatisfactory measure 
of firm size and risk because a firm can use its assets more or less 
intensively in ways that generate risk of externalized losses.  For 
example, a building containing airborne asbestos will generate less 
harm if it is mostly vacant than if it is fully occupied. All else being 
equal, a high-asset firm probably has a lower chance of externalizing 
risk because of the availability of a larger pool of assets to satisfy 
claimants.187 
5. Firm value.  Firm value and market capitalization are also 
imperfect measures of size for the purpose of estimating risk. The 
benefits of externalizing risk to parties other than shareholders may be 
reflected in a firm’s equity value. However, equity value is a noisy 
signal and could reflect many other factors such as expectations of 
future growth and profitability.188 
C. Signal vs. noise 
This section considers noise that could obscure our signal. What 
factors—other than investors’ and managers’ perceptions of risks that 
limited liability would enable them to externalize—could influence 
firms’ elections between limited liability and higher taxes? 
1. Investor wealth.  One concern is heterogeneity in investor 
wealth levels. Legal protections that limit liability are most valuable to 
those who have the most assets to lose. Because these investors’ assets 
are sufficiently large, recoveries may be high relative to collection 
costs. Legally created limited liability is not worth as much to those 
who have natural immunity by virtue of owning essentially nothing of 
value. 
Thus, wealthier investors may value limited liability more highly. 
However, wealthier investors are also likely to be more risk tolerant.189 
 
 186. The number of employees might be useful in conjunction with other measures, particu-
larly where concerns about manipulation of less transparent, self-reported measures might arise. 
 187. Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements, supra note 130, at 67–68. 
 188. KOLLER, supra note 111, at 72–73, 77, 151–56, 185. 
 189. Michael S. Finke & Sandra J. Huston, The Brighter Side of Financial Risk: Financial Risk 
Tolerance and Wealth, 24 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 233, 252–53 (2003); Terrence A. Hallahan, 
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Thus, variation among investors in risk aversion may help offset varia-
tion in the value of limited liability. 
There seems to be little reason to believe that investor wealth 
would vary systematically among firms in different industries or en-
gaged in different sorts of activities.190 Thus, differences in investor 
wealth may simply wash out. But if investor wealth does vary across 
groups of firms, the greater value of limited liability to investors with 
higher wealth levels could result in a limited liability tax operating in 
part as an inadvertent progressive wealth tax. On the other hand, the 
impact on wealthy investors could diminish over time if information 
generated by a limited liability tax results in new regulations and man-
datory insurance regimes that erode judgment-proof investors’ cost ad-
vantages. 
2. Risk aversion.  Corporate governance is a product of investor 
preferences, managerial preferences, and each group’s relative degree 
of control. Greater risk aversion should be associated with lower risk 
of externalization, because risk-averse parties will fear the losses they 
might incur in a downside scenario more than they value actuarially 
equivalent gains in an upside scenario. However, risk-averse investors 
will also value limited liability more than risk-neutral investors and 
therefore be more willing to pay for it, even at a lower risk level. If 
investor risk aversion consistently varies across categories of firms, this 
could introduce noise affecting the signal created by firms’ elections. 
As discussed above, fully diversified investors are often assumed 
to be risk neutral with respect to firm-specific risks, while investors who 
are not diversified and have a larger share of their wealth at risk in one 
investment may be more risk averse. All else being equal, this may sug-
gest that structures that facilitate diversification—like publicly trada-
ble and widely held ownership interests—tend to increase the risk of 
externalized losses by making investors more risk preferring. In con-
trast, investors in smaller, closely held companies with a small number 
 
Robert W. Faff & Michael D. McKenzie, An Empirical Investigation of Personal Financial Risk 
Tolerance, 13 FIN. SERV. REV. 57, 64–67 (2004); cf. Claudia R. Sahm, How Much Does Risk Tol-
erance Change?, 02 Q.J. FIN., no. 2, 2012, at 11 (finding that “[a] 10% higher level of average 
income is associated with a 0.9% higher relative risk tolerance”). 
 190. Cf. William N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Equity Portfolio Diversification, 12 REV. FIN. 
433, 449 (2008) (finding that “older, wealthier, more experienced, and financially sophisticated 
investors” hold more diverse investment portfolios). See generally Ajay Khorana, Henri Servaes 
& Peter Tufano, Explaining the Size of the Mutual Fund Industry Around the World, 78 J. FIN. 
ECON. 145 (2005) (noting that mutual funds, entities that invest in groups of firms to diversify 
risk, flourish in countries with wealthier and more educated populations). 
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of investors, each of whom have a large portion of their wealth tied up 
in the business, may be more risk averse. 
However, it is not necessarily the case that smaller, closely held 
firms are managed more conservatively than larger firms. The investors 
and managers of smaller firms may have sufficiently substantial assets 
that they can diversify even while making large, illiquid investments in 
individual firms. Or they may be risk-seeking.191 Among investors, 
those with greater income and wealth are generally assumed to be 
more tolerant of risk,192 and also likely to benefit more from limited 
liability than less wealthy investors who are more likely to be judgment 
proof. 
In the absence of strong evidence about a relation between the 
type of business entity and the risk of externalized losses, the most sen-
sible approach may be to tax equally regardless of business entity, as 
long as an entity confers limited liability. Thus, unlike the extant cor-
porate income tax, a limited liability tax would also apply to LLCs, S-
Corporations, LLPs, and LPs. 
3. Agency costs.  Publicly traded companies with diversified 
investors might not be run in a riskier fashion than smaller, closely held 
companies because of greater agency costs. Managers are often 
assumed to be more risk averse than investors because managers 
cannot diversify their employment in the same way that investors can 
diversify their investments.193 Diffuse ownership structures likely make 
it more challenging for shareholders to play a large role in governance. 
In the absence of shareholder pressure, managers may take fewer risks 
than would be optimal for shareholders.194 
Incentive compensation tied to share price can be used to align 
managerial interests more closely with those of shareholders, over-
come agency costs, and increase corporate risk-taking.195 If incentive 
compensation aligns managerial and shareholder interests, then firms 
 
 191. Robert E. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk of En-
trepreneurship, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1163, 1184–85 (2010). 
 192. Hallahan et al., supra note 189, at 58–59. 
 193. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 35, 36 (2014). 
 194. Bank, supra note 88, at 893 (describing managerial preferences to retain earnings and 
lock in a stable source of capital). 
 195. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 81, at 308. Such incentive compensation is explicitly en-
couraged under the Internal Revenue Code. For example, pay to top executives above $1 million 
is only deductible with respect to corporate taxes if that pay is in the form of incentive compen-
sation tied to stock price. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2011). 
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will likely make the optimal election with respect to the limited liability 
tax.196 If agency costs cause firms to behave as if they were risk averse, 
then the optimal proportion of firms electing limited liability (i.e., the 
proportion that suggests limited liability is appropriately priced) will 
be more than half. 
As noted above, investors have many tools at their disposal to 
both monitor managers197 and to align managers’ interests with their 
own. These are further bolstered by fiduciary duties and personal lia-
bility for managers, particularly in the wake of In re Caremark Int’l Inc. 
Derivative Litigation198 and Sarbanes-Oxley.199 Shareholders could also 
override management’s decision to forgo limited liability by opting for 
limited liability for their own holdings and paying their share of the fee. 
Some might nevertheless worry that managers could be reluctant 
to elect limited liability out of concern that such an election would be 
perceived as a negative signal by investors (potential defendants). A 
study of the transition of law firms from general partnerships to limited 
liability partnerships suggests that such concerns about signaling may 
be overstated. Law firm clients (potential plaintiffs) did not perceive a 
shift by their law firms to limited liability to be a negative signal.200 
4. Capital structure.  Capital structure will be largely irrelevant to 
the election as long as both the limited liability tax and the 
alternative—unlimited pro rata liability—are insensitive to a firm’s 
 
 196. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 80, at 726–28. Some scholars now worry that incentive 
compensation might lead to risk-taking that is excessive even from the perspective of risk-tolerant 
shareholders. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, supra note 86, at 273–76; Bolton, Mehran, 
& Shapiro, supra note 86, at 2139–41; Zhiyong Dong, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Do Executive Stock 
Options Induce Excessive Risk Taking?, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2518, 2522 (2010); Andrew Lund 
& Gregg Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 724–25 (2011); Tung, supra note 86, at 1206–07. 
Alternative compensation arrangements, such as restricted shares or defined benefit pen-
sion plans, may help make managers more cognizant of long-term risks, particularly if propor-
tionate unlimited liability attaches to the restricted shares. Tung, supra note 86, at 1241–47. 
 197. See supra Part IV.A. 
 198. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
 199. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 
968 (2009); H. Lowell Brown, Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the 
Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4–6 (2001); Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate 
Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 150 (2015); E. Nor-
man Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Gov-
ernance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 
1436–39 (2005).  
 200. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical 
Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 107, 146–47 (2005). 
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choice of capital structure. Revenue, unlike income, does not depend 
on capital structure. If pro rata unlimited liability is extended from 
shareholders to holders of warrants and financial creditors, then 
unlimited liability will also be insensitive to capital structure. However, 
if unlimited liability only applies to shareholders, then efforts to evade 
unlimited liability through financial engineering and changes in capital 
structure could present challenges.201 
5. Positive externalities and innovation.  Would taxing limited 
liability disproportionately burden firms that generate positive 
externalities and innovation? This seems unlikely, unless positive and 
negative externalities were highly correlated—in which case there 
might be no net externalities to worry about in the first place. The risk 
of externalization is not necessarily greater for more innovative firms. 
Even in ostensibly mature industries, new scientific knowledge related 
to risk is continuously discovered.202 
Limited liability with respect to tort claims and government fines 
is most attractive to those who expect to be found liable, presumably 
because they are funding activities they believe are potentially danger-
ous to other people. There are certainly positive externalities to eco-
nomic activity, but there is no reason to believe that positive external-
ities are correlated with either negative externalities or risk aversion. 
If positive and negative externalities are uncorrelated, and the lim-
ited liability tax falls most heavily on those activities that produce more 
negative externalities, then the limited liability tax is likely more effi-
cient than taxes that fall equally on activities regardless of their output 
of positive and negative externalities.203 This is true even if all activities 
have net positive externalities, as long as one assumes that the govern-
ment needs a source of revenue.204 Any negative impact on economic 
growth or innovation from a limited liability tax could be offset with 
 
 201. See supra Part II.E. 
 202. See, e.g., Anderson Abel de Souza Machado et al., Microplastics as an Emerging Threat 
to Terrestrial Ecosystems, 24 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2018); McLinden et al., supra note 
16, at 1. 
 203. ARTHUR PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 224–25 (2013); Baumol, supra note 13, 
at 307; cf. Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 
1679 (2015). 
 204. There is also a safety valve if the government overprices, because private firms have the 
option of declining to pay for limited liability and seeking private insurance instead (at least for 
insurable risks up to insurable limits). 
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increases in public investment or reductions in other, less efficient 
taxes.205 
Limited liability operates in the shadow of the tort system. If the 
tort system undercompensates victims for reasons other than limited 
liability, then a limited liability fee priced according to firms’ and in-
vestors’ willingness to pay would likely be low relative to externalized 
harms and would rarely discourage socially beneficial activity. Con-
cerns about extremely high investor risk aversion could be further ad-
dressed by setting the target percentage of firms that opt in to limited 
liability within a risk group relatively high. 
Innovation has cachet, and it is too easy to forget many innova-
tions that the world would probably have been better off without, such 
as Agent Orange,206 hydrogen-filled blimps,207 and lead additives in gas-
oline.208 Encouraging innovators and their funders to be mindful of 
risks to others is prudent. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article contributes to the optimal tax, corporate tax, and reg-
ulation and insurance literatures by considering limited liability as a 
form of public insurance that encourages greater risk-taking. In situa-
tions where businesses are already operating to maximize value for 
risk-neutral investors, limited liability leads to risk-taking that is so-
cially excessive. Some specific risks that were externalized to the gov-
ernment or other members of the public have been identified in the 
past and addressed through regulation or mandatory public or private 
insurance programs. Nevertheless, these risks were not always known, 
and it stands to reason that at any given point there will be risks that 
have not yet been identified. 
Although the precise nature and level of residual risks that might 
be externalized remain unknown, they are known unknowns: we know 
 
 205. See infra Appendix Part C.  
 206. See Facts About Herbicides, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, https://www.publi-
chealth.va.gov/exposures/agentorange/basics.asp [https://perma.cc/3HMD-P2PP] (providing an 
overview of the history, chemical composition, and health effects of Agent Orange). 
 207. See Donovan Webster, What Really Felled the Hindenburg?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 
4, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/80th-anniversary-hindenburg
-disaster-mysteries-remain-180963107 [https://perma.cc/3E5X-YDZV(describing the Hinden-
burg Disaster that happened in 1937, when a hydrogen-filled airship crashed in New Jersey).  
 208. See Philip J. Landrigan, Editorial, The Worldwide Problem of Lead in Petrol, 80 
BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 768 (2002) (describing the history of adding 
lead to gasoline and its disastrous health effects).  
SIMKOVIC IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2018  1:35 PM 
2018] LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE KNOWN UNKNOWN 329 
that these risks exist, that they are greater than zero, and that industry 
participants often understand them better than regulators or the gen-
eral public. Taxing limited liability can help improve efficiency both by 
forcing businesses to signal their degree of riskiness by opting either 
for limited liability or lower taxes, and by internalizing costs that would 
otherwise be externalized. This self-sorting would accelerate the risk 
discovery process by enabling those charged with managing risk to fo-
cus on self-identified high-risk firms. The key to maximizing the bene-
fits, and minimizing the costs, of a limited liability tax is to price ac-
cording to risk to the greatest extent possible. 
APPENDIX: ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS 
This Appendix briefly considers specific issues relating to the ad-
ministration of a limited liability tax. 
A. Multi-tier companies and pyramiding 
Companies and wealthy individuals routinely respond to taxation 
with tax avoidance strategies. Any tax regime therefore requires anti-
evasion rules and enforcement. A likely tax avoidance strategy is to 
divide operations and assets between limited liability and non-limited 
liability entities,209 or to create multi-tiered or pyramid entities. These 
strategies could be policed by consolidating the revenues of non-lim-
ited liability entities with those of the limited liability entities that have 
invested in them. As noted above, individuals or mutual fund managers 
could invest in unlimited liability companies through a limited liability 
entity. Passive investors would simply pay the proportional equivalent 
of what the portfolio company would have had to pay for limited lia-
bility for the investors’ interest in the company. The portfolio company 
would then count as partially electing limited liability, based on the 
fraction of investors who opt in despite management’s decision to forgo 
limited liability.  
 
 209. The classic example is the use of a corporation as a general partner in a limited partner-
ship. Hamill, supra note 5, at 410–12. There are many examples of the use of “blocker” and “stop-
per” entities. Willard B. Taylor, “Blockers,” “Stoppers,” and the Entity Classification Rules, 64 
TAX LAWYER 1, 1 (2010); see also LoPucki, supra note 65, at 69–71 (discussing judgment-proofing 
strategies based around dividing operations between asset-holding and risk-taking entities).  
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B. Who should collect? 
A second question is who should collect the limited liability tax. 
Ostensibly, this should be any government entity that will absorb ex-
ternalized harms. Such harms increase burdens on public insurance 
programs, such as those that provide health and disability benefits in 
the ordinary course, including Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, 
and state and local equivalents. Economic damage could also erode the 
tax base. And externalized harms might require public bailouts if they 
are large enough. Externalization of losses represents a cost borne at 
least in part by various levels of government. 
 
Enforcement would be easier if an unlimited liability regime were 
implemented at the federal rather than state level.210 Federal limited 
liability taxes might also be easier to administer. Federal taxes are less 
subject to competition and avoidance than state taxes. But state taxes 
would facilitate different assessments of risk levels and enable regula-
tors to observe firm responses at different price points. Firms that dis-
agreed vehemently enough with states’ assessments of risk could refuse 
to do business in those states, just as firms can decline to do business in 
states with excessive sales or income taxes, or overly plaintiff-friendly 
tort systems. 
C. How should the money be spent? 
A third question is how the revenue collected should be spent. 
How the money is spent is largely irrelevant to the goals of reducing 
information asymmetries regarding externalization risk, internalizing 
those risks, and dynamically improving regulation, with one exception. 
The funding could establish an agency to gather and analyze the data 
about risk generated by the limited liability tax and firm elections, re-
price limited liability between periods, study potentially hazardous ac-
tivities more closely, and make recommendations regarding regulation 
and mandatory insurance. 
The shorter the election periods and the more frequently limited 
liability is repriced, the sooner the price will be optimized based on 
firms’ elections, and the closer the price will be to the optimal price at 
 
 210. See Grundfest, supra note 101, at 395–96 (explaining that it would be difficult for state 
courts to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state shareholder defendants in a proportionate 
liability regime because of constitutional requirements). Note that proportionate liability is effec-
tively equivalent to unlimited liability because liable defendants pay their portion of the harm 
caused, without limitation by any other principle. 15 U.S.C. § 6605(a) (2012).  
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any given time. However, the shorter the periods, the more expensive 
the system will be to administer. It may therefore be sensible to initially 
start with relatively short periods during a calibration phase—perhaps 
2 years211—and then move to longer periods—perhaps close to 5 
years212—once pricing seems to stabilize near the optimal level. 
In any case, such an agency (or agencies) would likely require only 
a fraction of the revenue a limited liability tax would raise. All money 
flowing into and out of government is fungible. At some point, govern-
ments will spend money dealing with risks that have been externalized. 
The money collected can be used to pay down public debt, reduce other 
taxes, or increase spending in earlier periods, as long as the government 
is capable of increasing taxes or borrowing in later periods. 
If policymakers were concerned that a limited liability tax could 
decrease investment and positive externalities,213 then funds could be 
used to boost public investments that are complementary to innovation 
and economic growth, such as education, infrastructure, and R&D 
spending,214 to invest directly in the private sector through a sovereign 
wealth fund that could also act as a rainy-day fund,215 or to reduce taxes 
 
 211. State limited liability company registrations are typically renewed biennially.  
 212. Term loans, which entail assessments of risk by creditors, typically last five to seven years. 
 213. See supra Part IV.C.5.  
 214. See JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE PRICE OF CIVILIZATION: REAWAKENING AMERICAN 
VIRTUE AND PROSPERITY 18, 59, 175, 201, 220, 221, 258, 290 (revised ed. 2012) (discussing the 
need for increased funding for infrastructure, education, and R&D to promote economic growth); 
L. Jay Helms, The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic Growth: A Time Series—Cross 
Section Approach, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 574, 574 (1985) (“[W]hen [tax] revenue is used . . . to 
finance improved public services (such as education, highways, and public health and safety) the 
favorable impact on location and production decisions provided by the enhanced services may 
more than counterbalance the disincentive effects of the associated taxes.”); Michael Simkovic, 
The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1981, 1982–2003 (2015) (discussing the links between 
education and economic growth, and evidence of underinvestment in higher education); Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Unproductive Public Expenditures: A Pragmatic Approach to Policy Anal-
ysis, 48 IMF PAMPHLET SERIES 1, 20–26 (2005), http://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF054/15831-
9781557755414/15831-9781557755414/15831-9781557755414.xml [https://perma.cc/7QAK-H6RL] 
(discussing the relative contributions of education, infrastructure, health, nutrition, and military 
spending to economic growth).  
 215. See generally Bader Alhashel, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Literature Review, 78 J. ECON. 
& BUS. 1 (2015) (discussing the role of sovereign wealth funds in public saving and stabilizing 
government revenue, as well as controversies surrounding their returns and the extent to which 
they act politically rather than economically). 
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that decrease economic growth and are less targeted at risk externali-
zation.216 Establishing a rainy-day fund may be advisable if it is easy for 
the potential tax base to permanently leave the jurisdiction and thereby  
escape taxation,217 or if the government is liquidity constrained and 
would be unable to borrow at reasonable rates when externalized 
harms materialize.218 
 
 216. Simkovic, supra note 214, at 2030–34 (arguing for reductions in taxes that disproportion-
ately burden skilled labor and investment in higher education and research); Jens Arnold, Do Tax 
Structures Affect Aggregate Economic Growth? Empirical Evidence from a Panel of OECD Coun-
tries 18 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 643, 2008) (finding that individual and corporate 
income taxes have a more negative impact on economic growth than property taxes); but see Jing 
Xing, Tax Structure and Growth: How Robust Is the Empirical Evidence?, 117 ECON. LETTERS 
379, 379–82 (2012) (disputing the evidence that tax structure affects economic growth). 
 217. Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter 
Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1238–41 (2008) (discussing taxation and regulatory compe-
tition); Kane, supra note 170, at 87–93 (discussing corporate arbitrage of differences in interna-
tional tax rates). 
 218. See, e.g., Henning Bohn, The Behavior of U.S. Public Debt and Deficits, 113 Q. J. ECON. 
949, 959–62 (1998) (arguing that U.S. federal borrowing capacity may have limits); James D. Ham-
ilton & Marjorie A. Flavin, On the Limitations of Government Borrowing: A Framework for Em-
pirical Testing, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 808, 819 (1986) (same); cf. John H. Cochrane, A Frictionless 
View of U.S. Inflation, 13 NBER MACROECON. ANN. 323, 326–28 (1998) (arguing that inflation 
adjusts to ensure fiscal solvency).  
